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Abstract
In the decade following the global financial crisis, modern monetary theory has been forced to push the
envelope via interventionist interest rate policy across geographies, and even open market asset purchases
by central banks in select geographies, testing the bounds of optimal monetary policy. The unprecedented
entanglement of monetary policy and asset prices alludes to a relative blind-spot in the New Keynesian
literature – embedding asset pricing explicitly. The purpose of this paper is to develop an asset pricing
model where monetary policy impacts real variables and thus can be analyzed – the ambition is to provide
a proof-of-concept in developing a lens through which one may observe the effect monetary policy has on
the real economy via symptoms observed in financial markets (e.g. risk premiums) in a paradigm consistent
with modern New Keynesian theory. While asset pricing models and New Keynesian monetary models exist
individually, the challenge is integrating the two concepts in an appropriate framework and interpreting the
result.
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1Introduction
The efficacy and optimal role of monetary policy is a popular and constant debate in macroeconomics.
Monetary economics seeks to better understand the interplay between the business cycle, inflation, and
the optimal monetary policy – if any. To analyze monetary impacts, there has been a rigorous discourse
concerned with developing an appropriate framework – one with satisfactory mechanics, such as defensible
microeconomic foundations, which is also consistent with empirical data and past business cycle fluctuations.
In recent years, global macroeconomic developments and shocks have led to an interesting interplay between
monetary policy, global financial markets, and asset prices.
The global financial crisis has pushed central banks around the world to respond with non-traditional
monetary policy aimed at mitigating the economic impact experienced historically as financial systems emerge
from such crises. The desire to stabilize global economies and financial markets via countercyclical monetary
policy has led to an unprecedented relationship between monetary policy and asset prices. The important
historical consequence of the current interventionist monetary policy experiments around the world will be
reflected in data subsequent to the events. In order to understand the consequences of such monetary policy,
it is necessary to build economic models capable of interpreting and analyzing such data in the context of
financial market implications. The purpose of this paper is to develop an asset pricing model where monetary
policy impacts real variables and thus can be analyzed – the ambition is to provide a proof-of-concept in
developing a lens through which one may observe the effect monetary policy has on the real economy via
symptoms observed in financial market characteristics (e.g. risk premiums). While asset pricing models and
monetary models exist individually, the challenge is integrating the two concepts in an appropriate framework
and interpreting the result.
The classical dichotomy (Patinkin, 1965) is the belief that real variables are independent of monetary
variables. Money is said to be “neutral” if changes in the money supply only have an impact on nominal
variables and no impact on real variables. Any model with the ambition of connecting monetary policy and
the real economy must reject the classical dichotomy and correspondingly demonstrate that money is not
neutral. The New Keynesian framework combines monopolistic competition with nominal rigidity caused
by price or wage stickiness, or both, resulting in short run non-neutrality of monetary policy. Though a
review of the New Keynesian school of thought encounters a vast literature representing an evolution in
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macroeconomic thought spanning decades, asset pricing has not been an explicit focus of the literature to
date. The purpose of this paper is to develop an asset pricing model consistent with a world where monetary
policy can impact real variables, and thus an asset pricing model which is developed within an explicit New
Keynesian paradigm.
Modern monetary policy at many central banks is focused on the type of stabilization policy advocated
by the New Keynesian school of thought. In the face of an unanticipated exogenous shock to the economy,
New Keynesian analysis suggests an optimal nominal interest rate rule following what is prescribed by Taylor
(1993), which responds to the level of inflation and the output gap periodically. Such a policy is thought to
minimize periodic inflation and the periodic output gap, minimizing some of the distortions caused by an
exogenous shock in an economy facing nominal rigidity. However, in the pursuit of stabilizing the economy via
interest rates, households, firms, and central banks should be cognizant of potential unintended consequences
of policy — asset prices are a key area of study for potential unintended consequence, especially at the
individual household level due to the fact periodic asset prices have a significant impact on household wealth.
If policy responses impact asset prices, the door opens for households to consider the current and expected
future policy environments when transacting in asset markets and for firms to have a similar consideration
when contemplating repurchasing or issuing equity capital.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 will review the New Keynesian school of
thought, the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework that is the workhorse of the New
Keynesian paradigm, and consumption based asset pricing models. Chapter 3 will work through the the-
oretical background for a basic New Keynesian model by following the work of Gal´ı (2008), and a basic
consumption based asset pricing model by following Cochrane (2009) and Romer (2012), and will embed the
resulting relationships from the New Keynesian model into the consumption based asset pricing model. The
combination is first demonstrated for a closed economy before broadening to an open economy. Due to the
inability to find a closed-form solution, the resulting relationship must be linearized around a steady state
using a second-order approximation. Closed economy results are presented in Section 3.1, and open economy
results are presented in Section 3.2. Chapter 4 discusses the conclusions of the paper, as well as potential
areas of further research.
2
2Prior Research
There are multiple relevant sub-disciplines discussed within this paper — the New Keynesian macroeco-
nomic framework; dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) modeling; and asset pricing theory – each
with its own wealth of prior research. The New Keynesian framework cannot be captured by an isolated sem-
inal work, the paradigm represents an evolution in macroeconomic theory with microeconomic foundations
dating back to the 1970s. DSGE models are a class of general equilibrium models widely used in macroeco-
nomics built from microeconomic foundations where markets clear through price and quantity adjustments,
significantly overlapping with the New Keynesian literature. They can be used to describe the evolution of
economic variables over time, specifically in response to exogenous shocks. Asset pricing is a broad field with
a multiplicity of models, and must be narrowed specific to the use in this paper. The chapter is presented
in three sections. Section 2.1 discusses the background and history of research in New Keynesian economics.
Section 2.2 provides a brief introduction to DSGE models as they apply to New Keynesian monetary models.
Section 2.3 reviews the partition of asset pricing literature relevant to this particular paper.
2.1 The New Keynesian School
This section will cover a brief chronology and the development of key features from the New Keynesian
literature. For an alternative brief review of the New Keynesian literature see Woodford (2009); for a more
inclusive review of the literature and theory see Woodford (2003), Snowdon and Vane (2005), and Gal´ı (2008).
As the name suggests, the New Keynesian school of thought evolves from the orthodox Keynesian
school which itself has its roots in the classic text The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money
(Keynes, 1936). Economic instability, according to Keynes, is the product of “animal spirits” which leave
investors, business confidence, and thus economies susceptible to erratic shocks. The primary determinant of
aggregate output and employment is proposed to be nominal aggregate demand; with wages and prices not
fully flexible, where an economy might otherwise be slow to return to full employment after a shock, stabilizing
policy with a focus on aggregate demand would be desirable. Both monetary and fiscal policy could serve
such a purpose, but the former is thought to have a quicker and more targeted impact on aggregate demand.
Hicks (1937) brings forth the IS-LM model which illustrates the basic tenets of orthodox Keynesian thought,
and thus began the development of large-scale macroeconometric models reliant on systems of structural
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equations built from Keynes’ General Theory.
In the 1970s, the orthodox Keynesian approach came under criticism. Sargent and Wallace (1975)
demonstrate a simple ad hoc model asserting that the introduction of rational expectations leads to the
neutrality of monetary policy – the policy-ineffectiveness proposition. The work of Lucas (1976) brings forth a
need for the Keynesian paradigm to evolve, using empirical data to delineate orthodox Keynesian deficiencies.
The downfall of large-scale macroeconometric models built on Keynesian fundamentals is highlighted by
Lucas as the static nature of the relationships embedded within the structural equations, and the resulting
inability of such models to capture potential behavioral changes which follow structural deviations such as
policy or environmental change. Parameters of such models are typically estimated based on the historical
data available, which can only possibly reflect environments already captured in the time series. What is
referred to as the “Lucas Critique” highlights that a shift in the policy environment – a structural change
– will cause behavioral responses and ultimately parameters must change to reflect the new policy variables
and subsequent behavior; to accurately evaluate changes in policy, invariant parameters are required. After
Keynesian Macroeconomics by Lucas and Sargent (1978) is titled as if to eulogize Keynesian theory. The
analysis is an extension of the Lucas Critique pointed toward post-Keynes theoretical work which, over
several decades, stretched Keynes’s postulations into structural macroeconomic models relying on parameter
stability and policy-invariant structures. The key criticism of Lucas and Sargent has never been Keynesian
foundations, but rather the lack of a credible mechanism for optimizing behavior to bring forth nominal
rigidities, tentatively suggesting that equilibrium business cycle models avoid many of the shortcomings
highlighted.
In the face of empirical challenges, a vast body of work developed introducing the dynamics and micro-
foundations the Keynesian approach was criticized for lacking, while staying true to Keynesian foundations.
By disposing of the assumption that markets clear continuously, Fischer (1977) and Phelps and Taylor (1977)
illustrate how nominal shocks can impact the real economy in a framework with rational expectations, a re-
sult directly contradicting the widespread belief that rational expectations begets the classical dichotomy.
Fischer’s work introduces the idea of embedding rigidities in nominal wage by using staggered or overlapping
long-term wage contracts. Phelps and Taylor independently come to a similar and complementary conclu-
sion using price rigidity as a source nominal stickiness necessary to extinguish the classical dichotomy in a
framework with rational expectations and perfect information. The use of long-term contracts by Fischer,
and prices set in advance by Phelps and Taylor, imply costs associated with the activities of price setting
and wage negotiation. Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) develop the concept of “menu costs”, the explicit costs
associated with changing prices, asserting that adjusting prices can be costly and thus arguing that firms
will adjust prices intermittently instead of continuously. Small menu costs introduce a friction which makes
prices sticky and thus can ultimately lead to an aggregate demand externality bearing a large cost to society,
even if inflation is perfectly anticipated. The term can be broadened beyond the literal interpretation of
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menu costs associated with printing new menus to include a multiplicity of costs business managers incur
when nominal prices change.
Taylor (1979, 1980) discusses the appeal of rational expectations as evidenced by empirical and the-
oretical findings, and explores the microfoundations of how fixed-length staggered wages and contracts can
introduce frictions which impact the real economy even within a rational expectations framework. Using
one-year staggered wage contracts, Taylor connects the degree to which policy is accommodative with the
resulting fluctuations in the output gap – a real effect contradicting the policy-ineffectiveness proposition in
Sargent and Wallace (1975) despite assuming rational expectations. Taylor’s result suggests the existence of
ideal stabilizing policies in such a framework. Extending on the concept of staggered contracts, the pricing
mechanism in Calvo (1983), dubbed “Calvo Pricing”, exhibits nominal rigidity by modeling a firm’s ability
to reset price as a probabilistic function of the survival rate — price-setters are thus uncertain of how long
nominal prices will persist with the periodic outcome following a geometric distribution. The stochastic
nature introduces complexities as firms care about their prices relative to other firms intertemporally when
making their price-setting decision. Even if individual prices change frequently, the Calvo mechanism can
lead to prices which adjust slowly, as price setting firms in a given period are influenced by the price level
inertia of firms that cannot reset prices in the same period. Such inertia leads to persistent real effects even
when prices can adjust frequently.
Within the context of bounded rationality, Akerlof and Yellen (1985) discuss how nominal price and
wage inertia could be caused by firms not changing price unless there is a significant enough benefit, sug-
gesting a threshold that must be met instead of continuous updating. While the “near-rational” behavior
causes only small second-order losses at the level of the individual agent, there are relatively large result-
ing first-order variations in aggregate employment and output in the economy. Mankiw (1985) similarly
makes the case for sticky prices, illustrating how large welfare losses can result when firms optimize with
small menu costs due to private incentives. While investigating the importance of monopolistic competition
as a more accurate alternative to perfect competition, Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) illustrate a general
equilibrium model combining a monopolistically competitive model, following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), with
other imperfections to generate aggregate demand effects which perfect competition cannot. Monopolistic
competition is more consistent with orthodox Keynesian beliefs; whereas perfectly competitive markets clear
continuously, Keynesian agents are price-setters. A focus on monopolistic competition moves the mechanism
for nominal stickiness away from previous work on wages and staggered labour contracts toward prices set
by firms, as individual firms set prices more slowly than the rapid adjustments suggested by the existence
of a Walrasian auctioneer in perfectly competitive markets. Through the lens of monopolistic competition,
significant nominal frictions can be generated from the microfoundations of a profit maximizing firm facing
a menu cost – a small but real cost of adjusting prices. Consistent with the results discussed in Akerlof and
Yellen (1985) and Mankiw (1985), the model developed by Blanchard and Kiyotaki exemplifies how frictions
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in the form of small second-order menu costs faced by individual agents can lead to first-order effects on
output and welfare of the aggregate economy.
Ball et al. (1988) provides a comprehensive review of several of the key assumptions that began being
integrated into Keynesian models over the preceding decade, and test the implications against empirical
data, illustrating how far the literature developed over the period by systematically contrasting a basic New
Keynesian model with the Lucas (1973) model and previous critiques of orthodox Keynesian failures. By the
late 1980s, structural Keynesian models could embed imperfect competition and a price-setting mechanism
with friction (e.g. Calvo pricing) to address empirical failures of orthodox Keynesian structural models, as
pointed out by Lucas, while doing so in a manner adding microeconomic foundations which are more dynamic
in nature. The decline of Keynesian economics in the 1970s is discussed by Ball et al. as at least partly
due to the lack of an acceptable mechanism which leads to nominal rigidities from behavior consistent with
optimization, and the improvement in the 1980s is explicated as developing “... models in which optimizing
agents choose to create nominal rigidities” (Ball et al., 1988, p.2). After examining historical data for
evidence of price stickiness, the proposed model is demonstrated to match history well both qualitatively and
quantitatively, with parameters that are realistic, and illustrates a policy trade-off which corresponds to the
average rate of inflation — countries with low inflation exhibit relatively flat short-run Phillips curves while
countries with high inflation exhibit steeper curves. The intuition is that firms in an environment with higher
average inflation will choose to adjust prices more frequently, which in turn reduces the effects of nominal
shocks. As the magnitude of the result is substantial, not only does it violate the classical dichotomy, but it
also alludes to a significant role for monetary policy in such an economy.
Mankiw (1989) addresses real business cycle (RBC) theory as a competing explanation of macroeco-
nomic fluctuations compared to New Keynesian theory. Shortcomings of RBC theory include challenges
modeling a procyclical real wage and the explanation that welfare drops in a recession only because of a
decrease in technology modeled as a negative technological shock. Mankiw’s main reservation with New
Keynesian theory is the limited understanding of the nominal rigidities which are a cornerstone of any New
Keynesian model. Ball and Romer (1990) are similarly critical of the fact that prior attempts to explain wage
and price rigidity focus on real rigidity instead of nominal rigidity, asserting that real rigidity alone does not
imply nominal rigidity but instead nominal rigidity requires a nominal source of friction. However, Ball and
Romer illustrate that combining nominal frictions and real rigidity proves powerful in terms of explaining
non-neutrality of money for empirically plausible parameters.
The confluence of contributions led to what Goodfriend and King (1997) dubbed the “New Neoclassical
Synthesis” asserting that by combining the dynamic aspect of RBC with the microfoundations provided by
imperfect competition and nominal rigidities, what are now known as New Keynesian models were born.
Goodfriend and King discuss the four key ingredients for the new neoclassical synthesis as intertemporal
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optimization, rational expectations, imperfect competition, and costly price adjustments. The first two
elements build on new classical and RBC literature while the latter two elements build on the New Keynesian
literature, with a shared dependence on microeconomics as common ground between the RBC and New
Keynesian elements. The modeling and analysis from Goodfriend and King illustrates a resulting framework
for the economy in which money is not neutral in the short-run, inflation targeting is the key policy tool,
and central bank credibility is pivotal to the efficacy of policy.
Clarida et al. (1999) develop a New Keynesian model centered around three key equations in a DSGE
framework, and use the model to demonstrate the importance of credibility in addressing the trade-off between
inflation and output by deriving optimal policy both with and without central bank commitment. The three
key equations are: i) a dynamic version of the investment-savings (DIS) curve whereby current output is a
function of expected future output and interest rates; ii) a New Keynesian influenced version of the Philips
curve whereby inflation depends only on current and expected future economic states; and iii) a monetary
policy function — in this case a nominal interest rate rule. In the presence of nominal price rigidities using
a Calvo pricing mechanism, monetary policy fluctuations impact the short-term real rate and the optimal
policy is one where the nominal rate adjusts more than one-for-one with inflation, consistent with the principle
motivated by Taylor (1993).
Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) exemplify the culmination of New Key-
nesian progress from orthodox Keynesian roots — structural models desired by orthodox Keynesians, but
modernized by nimble components built on the microeconomic foundations of monopolistic competition, ra-
tional expectations, and nominal rigidities. The work by Smets and Wouters demonstrates a micro-founded
DSGE model that performs favorably compared to Bayesian Vector Autoregressions in terms of out-of-sample
forecasting using U.S. and European historical data. The modern models are DSGE models suitable for policy
analysis, which have been widely adopted by central banks. Gal´ı (2008) analyzes optimal monetary policy
within a basic New Keynesian model. The analysis suggests optimal monetary policy can be approximated
via a Taylor interest rate rule where the central bank, under commitment, targets an optimal level for the
output gap in order to stabilize the price level. The optimal policy in turn seeks to minimizes the impact,
or welfare losses, felt due to the dynamic series of short-term distortions caused by the rigidity of staggered
price-setting in the economy.
De Paoli et al. (2010) study asset prices in a New Keynesian model using second-order numerical
perturbation methods, with a focus on the relationship between the level of nominal rigidity and corresponding
risk premia. De Paoli et al. provide impulse response functions of certain variables as well as numerical output
of certain asset pricing characteristics such as returns and risk premia, but due to the use of numerical
approximation, deriving the expression for firm prices is not the focus of the paper. Whereas De Paoli et al.
is focused on numerical experiments in a New Keynesian framework and the corresponding output of asset
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pricing characteristics, Chapter 3 differs by embedding a New Keynesian framework directly into the firm
price equation then analytically deriving a Taylor approximation of the relationship between asset prices and
various parameters in a simplified New Keynesian framework before providing an illustrative calibration of
the result.
2.2 Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) refers to a modeling framework frequently used in
contemporary macroeconomic theory that describes the evolution of economic variables over time (dynamic),
where the economy is exposed to exogenous random shocks (stochastic), and all equilibrium quantities are
accounted for (general equilibrium). DSGE models have become the workhorse for New Keynesian theory,
thus a brief history of the DSGE literature is covered as it pertains to New Keynesian analysis. For a more
comprehensive discussion see Ferna´ndez-Villaverde (2010) and Romer (2012).
Blanchard (2016) provides a succinct delineation of the three key modeling choices which distinguish
the DSGE framework: the behavior of the agents present in the model is built from microfoundations;
the economy is imperfectly competitive with distortions such as nominal rigidity, monopoly power, and
imperfect information; and the model does not solve each equation individually but rather the model is
estimated as a system. Taking the temperature of the current state of DSGE models, Blanchard provides a
balanced discussion of current deficiencies and criticisms contrasted with a solid but “eminently improvable”
(Blanchard, 2016, p.1) foundation. Suggestions for improvement include better integration of the work from
other fields of economics on consumer behavior, and more willingness among the field to “share the scene
with other types of general equilibrium models” (Blanchard, 2016, p.4).
While the literature of New Keynesian theory has become increasingly entangled with the DSGE frame-
work, it is important to distinguish the two – modern New Keynesian models are DSGE models but not all
DSGE models are New Keynesian. The roots of the DSGE framework are often credited to Kydland and
Prescott (1982) for their work spearheading real business cycle (RBC) theory, another school of thought
which uses DSGE modeling that was developed contemporaneous to the evolution of the New Keynesian
school. Developed after Lucas (1976) demanded the field of macroeconomics to more explicitly model mi-
crofoundations, Kydland and Prescott use a calibrated DSGE framework to analyze and develop an RBC
model with the desirable building blocks of rational expectations, optimizing behavior, and market clearing.
Responding to the concerns of the Lucas Critique, the early combinations of the DSGE framework and RBC
modeling created what seemed to be a relatively parsimonious macroeconomic model which closely resembled
observed historical data. The resulting reliance on technological shocks as an explanation for much of the
business cycle has since been refuted, for example in Summers (1986) and Mankiw (1989), but the use of
recursive methods helped motivate DSGE models as a tool for modern quantitative macroeconomic analysis.
8
The general equilibrium model developed by Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) provides what has become
a standard New Keynesian building block which injects monopolistic competition but lacks the dynamism
exemplified in RBC models with intertemporal general equilibrium frameworks. Indeed, as the New Keynesian
school sought to free itself from the grips of the Lucas Critique, the literature worked toward using its own
version of a DSGE framework. In her comments in Goodfriend and King (1997), Ellen McGrattan concedes
that work she contributed to in Chari et al. (1997) is essentially a dynamic version of the Blanchard-Kiyotaki
model. DSGE models generally contain a continuum of infinitely lived agents, such as households and firms,
optimizing intertemporally across an infinite-horizon. As emphasized by Woodford (2003), in theory, dynamic
models based on optimizing behavior at the forward-looking individual level defend against the Lucas Critique
via resulting policy-invariant parameters. A fully dynamic model with defensible microfoundations leads to
a model suited for analysis of policy intervention, shocks, and various transmission mechanisms. Examples
of modern DSGE models include the work by Clarida et al. (1999), Christiano et al. (2005), and Smets and
Wouters (2003, 2007). Christiano et al. (2017) discusses how DSGE models have changed in response to the
financial crisis.
Due to the complexity of aspiring to provide a rich macroeconomic model spanning an infinite horizon,
one of the foremost problems continually encountered in the development of DSGE models is the fact that
the framework rarely lends itself to closed-form solutions, especially with realistic assumptions. Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde et al. (2016) contains a comprehensive review of DSGE solution methods. The commonality is
that solution methods generally involve three key ingredients: a system of equations describing equilibrium
in the form of Euler equations or value functions; a form of approximation, for example linearization via
Taylor approximation around a non-stochastic steady state; and a form of estimation, for example calibration
using empirical parameters. For the purposes of this paper, the important notion is that while modern New
Keynesian models generally cannot be solved explicitly with a closed-form solution, they can be approximated
and estimated locally. Though imperfect, if the model is rich enough, the lack of a closed-form solution does
not necessarily preclude a model from providing useful inference as evidenced by recent literature.
Indeed, as far as the field has developed, there is still significant discourse over certain deficiencies.
Though widely adopted as a modeling convenience, Calvo pricing has come under criticism from empirical
DSGE analysis. Through investigating How Structural Are Structural Parameters? Ferna´ndez-Villaverde
et al. (2007) suggest that structural DSGE parameters used in modern models with Calvo pricing are mis-
specified due to the pricing mechanisms inability to capture the proper evolution of price. Chari et al. (2009)
derives a similar result, concluding that New Keynesian models are still not developed enough to provide
useful policy analysis. Charles Plosser shares a discomfort with the fact that “micro data on price behavior
is not particularly consistent with the implications of the usual staggered price-setting assumptions in these
models” (Plosser et al., 2012, p.5). State dependent pricing, such as the model proposed in Gertler and Leahy
(2008) has been proposed as an attractive alternative, but introduces its own host of complexities and requires
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certain restrictions and assumptions to obtain an analytical solution. As alluded to by Blanchard (2016),
New Keynesian DSGE models still need to evolve from their nascent state, but appear to be a favorable
foundation to build upon.
2.3 Consumption Based Asset Pricing
New Keynesian DSGE literature is at the forefront of modern macroeconomics and is currently evolving.
Indeed, despite constant progress toward refining contributions, the core foundation of the New Keynesian
framework is well established. In the last decade post-global financial crisis, modern monetary theory has
been forced to push the envelope via interventionist interest rate policy across geographies and even open
market asset purchases by central banks in select geographies, testing the bounds of the aforementioned
developments surrounding non-neutrality and optimal monetary policy. The result is an unprecedented
entanglement of monetary policy and asset prices, which therein alludes to a relative blind-spot in the New
Keynesian literature – embedding asset pricing explicitly.
Rather than relitigating the long history of asset pricing literature, as it is tangential to the purpose
of this paper, this section introduces a basic but well-established consumption-based asset pricing model,
following Cochrane (2009) which provides a comprehensive foundation for modern asset pricing, and Romer
(2012) which introduces consumption-based asset pricing within the context of macroeconomic analysis. The
basic premise is that as agents make a consumption versus savings decision with a potential portfolio of
assets included, the pricing equation follows from the first-order condition which relates asset price with the
marginal rate of substitution between present and future consumption, accounting for investment returns.
Assets, or firms, are explicitly valued using the stream of expected future dividends, or cash flows, and the
stochastic discount factor which represents the marginal rate of substitution, also called the pricing kernel.
This lens can be applied to any financial security or any stream of uncertain cash flows, and results in an asset
pricing framework in which agents care not only about the level of asset prices but the covariance between
asset prices and their periodic consumption, also called the “consumption beta”.
The foundation for consumption-based asset pricing began with the work of Rubinstein (1976) on
valuing stochastic income streams. Lucas (1978) derived Euler equations for asset pricing in an exchange
economy, serving as a building block for future empirical work on consumption-based asset pricing. Work in
Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) and Breeden (1979) bring forth more general modeling which has come to
define the consumption capital asset pricing model (CCAPM). For a full review of the CCAPM literature,
including a comprehensive review of the plethora of empirical tests, see Breeden et al. (2015).
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3Theory and Model
This chapter will include two parts, Section 3.1 works through real firm price in a closed economy
as an introduction to the concept in a simplified framework, Section 3.2 covers the same concept in an
open economy. Despite the use of several ad hoc simplifying assumptions, opening the economy introduces
significant complexity to the model due to the introduction of additional terms and notation. Each case
will begin with a definition of firm price using a consumption-based approach. Standard New Keynesian
assumptions are introduced and embedded in order to augment the asset pricing model in a framework
consistent with the New Keynesian paradigm. The intended result is an asset pricing framework which is
consistent with the assumptions of a basic New Keynesian economy.
3.1 Real Firm Price in a Closed Economy
Beginning with a consumption-based approach to asset pricing similar to what is found in Cochrane
(2009) and Romer (2012), firms at the initial time period, denoted as ft, are priced using the stream of
expected future dividends, and a stochastic discount factor (also called the pricing kernel, or marginal rate
of substitution):
ft =
∞∑
j=1
βjEt
[
u′(Ct+j)
u′(Ct)
dt+j
]
(3.1)
The consumption-based asset pricing model is a version of the discounted cash flow valuation model
that is ubiquitous in finance, with the microeconomic wrinkle provided by the marginal rate of substitution
between present and future consumption. By embedding the trade-off in terms of individual agent’s periodic
utility, a key result is that agents in a consumption-based framework care specifically about not just the level
of asset prices but also the covariance between asset prices and their periodic consumption. Ct represents
periodic consumption, while dt denotes periodic dividends, and β is the standard discount rate from present
value theory.
Utility is assumed to follow a separable isoelastic utility function, where σ is the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution for consumption and ϕ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for labour, and its
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corresponding marginal utility function and marginal rate of substitution between present and future con-
sumption:
U(Ct, Nt) =

C1−σt
1−σ − N
1−ϕ
t
1−ϕ σ 6= 1;ϕ 6= 1
C1−σt
1−σ − ln(Nt) σ 6= 1;ϕ = 1
ln(Ct)− N
1−ϕ
t
1−ϕ σ = 1;ϕ 6= 1
ln(Ct)− ln(Nt) σ = 1;ϕ = 1
⇒ u′(Ct) =
C
−σ
t σ 6= 1
1
Ct
σ = 1
⇒ u
′(Ct+j)
u′(Ct)
=
(
Ct+j
Ct
)−σ
Real dividends, dt, are defined as firm profits, or the portion of real output Yt that is retained by the
firm after paying labour its real wages. Where Wt represents nominal wages, Pt represents the price level,
and Nt is the quantity of labour, real firm profits can be defined as:
dt+j = Yt+j − Wt+j
Pt+j
Nt+j
Substituting the results from the assumed period utility function and definition of real dividends into
(3.1) results in:
ft =
∞∑
j=1
βjEt
[(
Ct+j
Ct
)−σ (
Yt+j − Wt+j
Pt+j
Nt+j
)]
(3.2)
The next steps begin to follow the Basic New Keynesian Model in Gal´ı (2008). The model introduces
infinitely-lived utility maximizing households which allocate consumption expenditure across a continuum of
goods. The goods market only considers a final goods sector. Periodic consumption, Ct, represents an index
of consumption aggregated across the continuum of goods, within [0, 1] space, and with constant elasticity of
substitution between goods as follows:
Ct ≡
(∫ 1
0
Ct(i)
1− 1 di
) 
−1
Ct(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−
Ct
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Ct(i) and Pt(i) represent the quantity and price, respectively, of good i. The aggregate price level is
defined similarly:
Pt ≡
(∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1− 1 di
) 
−1
Assuming optimal behavior given prices results in the following relationship between the product of the
price index and quantity index, and total consumption expenditure:
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Ct(i)di = PtCt
Firms produce differentiated goods, with the index i corresponding to the goods produced by each firm.
Technology, At, is identical across firms. Labour, Nt(i), is the input for each firm, with firms as price takers
in the labour market. Firm output, Yt(i), is thus defined as follows:
Yt(i) = AtNt(i)
1−α
Firms face the isoelastic demand schedule of households, and set prices following a pricing mechanism
as proposed in Calvo (1983). The use of differentiated goods introduces a degree of imperfect competition in
the goods market. The Calvo pricing mechanism delineates that each firm has a probability (1− θ) to have
the ability to reset prices, which introduces price stickiness as price dynamics are driven by firms reoptimizing
periodically. The result is a 3-equation framework as follows (as utilized in Appendix A):
pit = βEt[pit+1] + κYˆt (A.1)
Yˆt = − 1
σ
(it − Et[pit+1]− rnt ) + Et[Yˆt+1] (A.2)
it = ρ+ φpipit + φyYˆt + vt (A.3)
Equation (A.1) is the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) which expresses periodic inflation, pit, as a
function of expected inflation in the next period, pit+1, and the current output gap, Yˆt, with κ = λ
[
σ + (ϕ+α)1−α
]
and λ = (1−θ)(1−βθ)θ . Equation (A.2) is the dynamic IS equation (DIS) which expresses the periodic output
gap, Yˆt, as a function of the difference between the real interest rate, rt ≡ it − Et[pit+1], and the natural
rate of interest, rnt , and next period’s expected output gap. Equation (A.3) is a simple Taylor-type interest
rate rule where the periodic nominal interest rate, it, responds to inflation and the output gap in the current
period with coefficients φpi and φy measuring the responsiveness of policy to each variable respectively. The
policy shock vt follows an AR(1) process with zero mean where ρv ∈ [0, 1):
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vt = ρvvt−1 + vt
Returning to the firm pricing equation and imposing two equilibrium conditions on (3.2):
i) Goods Market Clearing⇒ Ct = Yt
ii) Labour Market Clearing⇒ Wt+j
Pt+j
=
∂Yt+j
∂Nt+j
= (1− α)At+jN−αt+j
⇒ ft =
∞∑
j=1
βjEt
[(
Yt+j
Yt
)−σ (
Yt+j − (1− α)At+jN1−αt+j
)]
⇒ ft =
∞∑
j=1
βjEt
[
Y 1−σt+j Y
σ
t − (1− α)Y −σt+jY σt At+jN1−αt+j
]
It should be noted that the labour market clearing condition introduces the output elasticity of labour,
the parameter (1− α). Using the approximation of the relationship between aggregate output (Yt), employ-
ment (Nt), and technology (At) from Gal´ı (2008, p.46):
Yt ≈ AtN1−αt
⇒ Yt+j ≈ At+jN1−αt+j
⇒ ft =
∞∑
j=1
βjEt
[
Y 1−σt+j Y
σ
t − (1− α)Y −σt+jY σt Yt+j
]
⇒ ft =
∞∑
j=1
βjEt
[
Y 1−σt+j Y
σ
t − (1− α)Y 1−σt+j Y σt
]
⇒ ft =
∞∑
j=1
βjEt
[
αY 1−σt+j Y
σ
t
]
⇒ ft = α
∞∑
j=1
βjEt
[
Y 1−σt+j Y
σ
t
]
(3.3)
The above result is an equation for real firm price which depends on the expected path of periodic
output. Intuitively α acts as a scale factor, even though capital has not been modeled explicitly, α represents
the output elasticity of capital which corresponds to the previously defined parameter for the output elasticity
of labour. Unfortunately, this equation at time t comes without having formed a meaningful expectation for
output in each discrete future period. Even a relatively simple closed economy model is abruptly confronted
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with one of the downfalls of DSGE modeling — there does not seem to be a closed-form solution that would
allow for a clean interpretation of the above relationship. In order to simplify the interpretation of the above
result, a second-order Taylor approximation of (3.3) around the steady state value of output is necessary.
A second-order approximation will preserve second-order moments which include variance terms. Where Y¯
is the steady state value of output and the output gap is defined as Yˆt =
Yt−Y¯
(Y¯ )
(see Appendix B for full
approximation):
Y 1−σt+j Y
σ
t ≈ Y¯ + σ(Yt − Y¯ ) + (1− σ)(Yt+j − Y¯ )
+
1
2
σ(σ − 1)Y¯ −1(Yt − Y¯ )2 + 1
2
(1− σ)(−σ)Y¯ −1(Yt+j − Y¯ )2
+ σ(1− σ)Y¯ −1(Yt − Y¯ )(Yt+j − Y¯ )
⇒ Y 1−σt+j Y σt ≈ Y¯ [1 + σYˆt + (1− σ)Yˆt+j +
1
2
σ(σ − 1)Yˆt2 − 1
2
σ(1− σ)Yˆ 2t+j
+ σ(1− σ)YˆtYˆt+j ]
⇒ ft ≈ αY¯
∞∑
j=1
βjEt[1 + σYˆt + (1− σ)Yˆt+j + 1
2
σ(σ − 1)Yˆt2
− 1
2
σ(1− σ)Yˆ 2t+j + σ(1− σ)YˆtYˆt+j ]
(3.4)
At this stage the expression found in Gal´ı (2008, p.51) for the output gap in terms of the economy’s
modeled monetary policy shock vt can be utilized (see Appendix A for full derivation):
Yˆt = −(1− βρv)Λvvt (3.5)
As previously noted, vt is exogenous and follows an AR(1) process with a zero mean. Note that
vt = ρvvt−1 + vt with Et[t+i] = 0 and V art[t+i] = σ
2
 ∀ i > 0. By substituting in (3.5), the sum in (3.4)
can be rewritten as follows (see Appendix B for full derivation):
⇒ ft = αY¯
[ β
1− β − σ(1− βρv)Λvvt
(
β
1− β
)
− (1− σ)(1− βρv)Λvvt
(
βρv
1− βρv
)
+
1
2
σ(σ − 1)(1− βρv)2Λ2vv2t
(
β
1− β
)
− 1
2
σ(1− σ)(1− βρv)2Λ2v
[
v2t
(
ρ2vβ
1− ρ2vβ
)
+ σ2
β
(1− β)(1− ρ2vβ)
]
+ σ(1− σ)(1− βρv)2Λ2vvt
(
βρv
1− βρv
)]
(3.6)
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Parameters can be collected, where:
b0 = α
(
β
1− β
)
Y¯
b1 = αY¯
[
− σ(1− βρv)Λv
(
β
1− β
)
− (1− σ)(1− βρv)Λv
(
βρv
1− βρv
)
+ σ(1− σ)(1− βρv)2Λ2v
(
βρv
1− βρv
)]
b2 =
1
2
αY¯ σ(σ − 1)(1− βρv)2Λ2v
[( β
1− β
)
+
(
ρ2vβ
1− ρ2vβ
)]
b3 =
1
2
αY¯ σ(σ − 1)(1− βρv)2Λ2v
(
β
(1− β)(1− ρ2vβ)
)
⇒ ft = b0 + b1vt + b2v2t + b3σ2 (3.7)
Using a second-order Taylor approximation results in an approximated linear equation for real firm
price. The real firm price in the basic closed New Keynesian economy can be approximated as a function of
the monetary policy shock vt, the square of the monetary policy shock v
2
t , the variance of the error term from
the AR(1) process for the monetary policy shock σ2 , and coefficients bi which depend on various economic
parameters defining the steady state of the economy. Recall that the derivation above is relevant where
σ 6= 1. If σ = 1, consistent with log utility, and u(ct) = log(ct), it can be shown σ = 1 becomes a special
case where b0 = αY¯
(
β
1−β
)
; b1 = αY¯
(
β
1−β
)
(1 − βρv)Λv; and b2 = b3 = 0 which means that variances do
not impact firm prices (see Appendix F for full derivation). This is due to the constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) associated with power utility, where σ = 1 is consistent with CRRA = 1 and the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution EIS = 1σ = 1. The result suggests that in an economy characterized by agents
with CRRA = σ = 1 firm prices around a non-stochastic steady state in period t are a function of steady state
output, the economic parameters characterizing the steady state, and the monetary policy shock realized in
period t.
However, where σ 6= 1 the approximation becomes more interesting. For the ease of interpretation,
prior to making any assumptions about σ, each of the coefficients bi will be approximated by calibrating the
equation with the following assumptions from Gal´ı (2008, p.52), which are quarterly where appropriate:
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Table 3.1: Summary Calibration Parameters — Closed Economy
Parameter Assumed Value
β 0.99
α 13
 6
ϕ 1
θ 23
ρv 0.5
φpi 1.5
φy
1
8
Where the calibration strays from Gali’s assumptions is in examining the case where σ 6= 1 as the
special case of σ = 1 has already been discussed. The direction and magnitude of the resulting bi coefficients
from (3.7) can be analyzed using the above inputs and equations for a variety of potential σ, and thus the
remaining parameters λ, κ, and Λv, can be solved in terms of σ. As well, b0 depends only on α and β and
thus can be calibrated independent of σ.
⇒ λ = (1− θ)(1− βθ)
θ
= 0.17
⇒ κ = λ
[
σ +
(ϕ+ α)
1− α
]
= 0.17σ + 0.34
⇒ Λv = 1
(1− βρv)(σ(1− ρv) + φy) + κ(φpi − ρv) =
1
0.4225σ + 0.403125
b0 = α
(
β
1− β
)
Y¯ = 33Y¯ (3.8)
Since β = 0.99 is a quarterly estimate, consistent with an annual steady state real rate of approximately
4 percent, Y¯ correspondingly represents a quarterly measure of steady state output in this calibration. The
calibrated parameter values and corresponding values for λ, κ, and Λv, can be used to solve for b1, b2, and
b3 in terms of σ:
b1 =
1
3
(
0.249975σ(1− σ)
(0.4225σ + 0.403125)2
− 0.495(1− σ)
0.4225σ + 0.403125
− 49.995σ
0.4225σ + 0.403125
)
Y¯ (3.9)
b2 =
(
4.22189(σ − 1)σ
(0.4225σ + 0.403125)2
)
Y¯ (3.10)
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b3 =
(
5.59191(σ − 1)σ
(0.4225σ + 0.403125)2
)
Y¯ (3.11)
Part of the motivation for solving other parameters and coefficients in terms of σ is the fact that σ is
perhaps the most contentious parameter to calibrate empirically. In their seminal work on the equity risk
premium puzzle, Mehra and Prescott (1985) review past studies estimating the parameter with resulting
values ranging from 0 to 2. Indeed, Mehra and Prescott struggle to reconcile empirical measures of the coeffi-
cient of relative risk aversion with the empirical risk-free rate and equity risk premium — under conventional
asset pricing models the empirical equity premium requires an implausibly high σ, whereas the empirical
risk-free rate requires a much lower σ. Lucas (2003) uses σ = 1 or log utility, discussing how risk aversion
coefficients used in literature range from 1 to 4. Using per capita consumption growth rates and the after-tax
return on capital in the United States Lucas argues that σ under CRRA preferences is at most 2.5, and
further suggests that a value of 2.5 would lead to much larger interest rate differentials between mature and
fast-growing economies than what is observed. Using labour supply data Chetty (2006) estimates σ ≈ 1,
with estimates ranging from 0.15 to 1.78, and argues that σ = 2 should serve as an upper bound based on
patterns of labour supply and complementarity between consumption and labour. Havra´nek (2013) provides
a meta-analysis of the literature on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) for consumption, the
inverse of σ ( 1σ ) in the context of this model, finding that past research using micro-based data contains
bias overstating estimates by an average of 0.5. Adjusting for bias, Havranek suggests corrected means of
approximately 0.3 - 0.4 for the micro-based estimates, and suggests that EIS estimates above 0.8 cannot
be reconciled with what is observed empirically. 1σ = EIS < 0.8 implies σ > 1.25 and likewise a range of
approximately 0.3 - 0.4 on EIS suggests a corresponding value for σ roughly between 2.5 and 3.3. Gandelman
et al. (2015) studies the relative risk aversion coefficient at the country level, across a sample of 75 countries,
with individual estimates falling between 0 and 3 and median and mean estimates close to 1.
Even without an exhaustive review of the literature pertaining to the coefficient of relative risk aversion,
or the inversely the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, it becomes clear that σ in this context is not
definitive though there is some information useful in triangulating the neighborhood of plausible empirical
values of σ. Instead of embedding a prescriptive value of σ, as that would be tangential to the purpose of
the paper, a range of plausible values can be calibrated and used to approximate the bi coefficients and their
behavior about that range of values. As expressed in (3.9), (3.10), and (3.11) respectively, b1 has no positive
zeros, while b2 and b3 have zeros at σ = 0 and σ = 1.
Recall from (3.7):
ft = b0 + b1vt + b2v
2
t + b3σ
2
 (3.7)
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Table 3.2: Calibration Summary — Closed Economy
σ 1σ = EIS b0 b1 b2 b3
0 Undefined 33Y¯ −0.41Y¯ 0 0
0.25 4.00 33Y¯ −8.37Y¯ −3.06Y¯ −4.05Y¯
0.5 2.00 33Y¯ −13.64Y¯ −2.80Y¯ −3.70Y¯
0.75 1.33 33Y¯ −17.39Y¯ −1.53Y¯ −2.02Y¯
1.0 1.00 33Y¯ −20.18Y¯ 0 0
1.5 0.67 33Y¯ −24.09Y¯ 2.95Y¯ 3.90Y¯
2.0 0.50 33Y¯ −26.68Y¯ 5.42Y¯ 7.18Y¯
2.5 0.40 33Y¯ −28.53Y¯ 7.43Y¯ 9.85Y¯
3.0 0.33 33Y¯ −29.91Y¯ 9.08Y¯ 12.02Y¯
3.5 0.29 33Y¯ −30.98Y¯ 10.43Y¯ 13.82Y¯
For example, if it is believed the economy is best characterized by σ = 1.5 then the calibration for (3.7)
becomes:
ft = 33Y¯ − 24.09Y¯ vt + 2.95Y¯ v2t + 3.90Y¯ σ2 (3.12)
Or alternatively the firm price equation can be written relative to steady state output:
ft
Y¯
= 33− 24.09vt + 2.95v2t + 3.90σ2 (3.13)
To interpret the relationship between the policy shock and firm price for each value of σ, prospective
values for vt can be plugged into the corresponding calibrated equation. For example, if σ = 1.5 then equation
(3.12) would be used. Equation (3.5) can be used to find the output gap for prospective pairs of σ and vt.
Continuing with the example of σ = 1.5, and assuming for ease of illustration that σ ≈ 0, (3.5) suggests a
shock of vt = 1% results in an output gap of Yˆt = −0.49% which leads to a corresponding change in firm
price of −0.73%1. Similarly for σ = 1.5 a shock of vt = 10% is associated with an output gap of Yˆt = −4.87%
1Recall that the output gap is expressed relative to steady state output, that is Yˆt =
Yt−Y¯
(Y¯ )
. As well, firm price changes are
relative to f¯ = 33Y¯ which is the case when vt = 0 and σ = 0. The results vary in σ as follows:
For σ = 0, vt = 1% results in Yˆt = −1.25% and a change in firm price of −0.01%.
For σ = 0.25, vt = 1% results in Yˆt = −0.99% and a change in firm price of −0.25%.
For σ = 0.5, vt = 1% results in Yˆt = −0.82% and a change in firm price of −0.41%.
For σ = 0.75, vt = 1% results in Yˆt = −.70% and a change in firm price of −0.53%.
For σ = 1, vt = 1% results in Yˆt = −.61% and a change in firm price of −0.61%.
For σ = 1.5, vt = 1% results in Yˆt = −.49% and a change in firm price of −0.73%.
For σ = 2, vt = 1% results in Yˆt = −.40% and a change in firm price of −0.81%.
For σ = 2.5, vt = 1% results in Yˆt = −.35% and a change in firm price of −0.86%.
For σ = 3, vt = 1% results in Yˆt = −.30% and a change in firm price of −0.90%.
For σ = 3.5, vt = 1% results in Yˆt = −.27% and a change in firm price of −0.94%.
For σ = 4, vt = 1% results in Yˆt = −.24% and a change in firm price of −0.96%.
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and a corresponding decrease in firm price of −7.21%.
In interpreting the results it is important to recall (3.5) which establishes a negative relationship between
the output gap and the economy’s monetary policy shock vt. Further, recall that σ
2
 = V art[t+i].
Yˆt = −(1− βρv)Λvvt (3.5)
Interpreting b0 is relatively easy as it is essentially the present value of a perpetuity, where the coupon
payment or dividend is the firm’s share of steady state output in the economy and is thus proportional to α
and Y¯ , the only other factor effecting b0 is β which corresponds to the discount rate.
The coefficient b1 represents the first-order effect of the monetary policy shock on firm prices in the
economy. It is constructive to recall that the shock vt is introduced into the model for firm prices via the
output gap, Yˆ . Since vt is negatively related with the output gap as illustrated in (3.5), positive shocks
decrease output in a persistent fashion due to the autoregressive nature of the shock, thus the negative
relationship between firm value and vt reflected in b1. The other phenomenon is that b1 is decreasing in σ
and conversely b1 is positively related to the EIS. At first glance, the result may seem similar to what would
be expected in a consumption and savings problem, but it is important to recognize that in this model there
is no alternative mechanism for savings aside from investing in firms. The mechanism for fluctuations in
periodic consumption is via the periodic output gap which is driven by vt. Tracing back to the beginning, it
appears that the differing impact of vt on firm prices for various levels of σ flows from the impact of σ on the
utility function and thus the stochastic discount factor — specifically the ratio of periodic marginal utilities
of consumption, combined with fluctuations in Ct and Ct+j — the path of consumption which is distorted
by the monetary policy shock’s impact on the periodic output gap. Since vt follows an AR(1) process and
ρv = 0.5 in the calibration, vt > 0 will have a much larger negative impact on Ct than Ct+j . Thus in the
stochastic discount factor βj
u′(Ct+j)
u′(Ct)
= βj
(
Ct+j
Ct
)−σ
the impact of vt will decrease the denominator by more
than the numerator. Since the ratio of future and present consumption is to the power of −σ, the result is
that vt > 0 will decrease the stochastic discount factor and the magnitude of the decrease will be positively
related to σ. The decrease in the stochastic discount factor decreases firm prices as the stochastic discount
factor is a scale factor on dividends, as reflected in (3.1). Conversely if vt < 0 the opposite occurs where Ct
increases by more than Ct+j and thus the stochastic discount factor increases resulting in higher firm prices.
In order to interpret b2 and b3, recall that the model’s only mechanism to save and transfer wealth
intertemporally is via capital invested in firms. Thus embedded in b2 and b3 are observations of two competing
effects simultaneously: the risk aversion component associated with the investment decision and a prudence
component associated with the savings decision. Since households are risk averse, in isolation higher volatility
should reduce corresponding asset values when considering the household investment decision. Conversely,
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risk averse households facing an intertemporal savings decision with stochastic future income will exhibit
a level of prudence, or precautionary savings as coined by Leland (1968), with the competing effect that a
higher volatility of expected future income in isolation should increase the value of savings as a household
seeks to self-insure future consumption.
Due to the competing factors, as illustrated in Table 3.2, b2 and b3 are dependent on the level of
household risk aversion, σ, both in terms of the magnitude of each coefficient as well as the direction. The
second-order effect of the output change resulting from the monetary policy shock is approximated by b2, while
the second-order effect of the policy shock’s variance is approximated by b3. For σ = 0, the approximation of
b2 = b3 = 0 reflects the fact that household utility exhibits no risk aversion and thus there is no risk aversion
on the investment component and no prudence on the savings component. As soon as σ > 0, the effect of risk
aversion is immediately observed via negative approximations for b2 and b3 which reflect lower asset values
due to correspondingly higher risk premiums. However, as σ increases the effect of prudence is observed as
b2 and b3 increase until b2 = b3 = 0 at σ = 1. For σ > 1, prudence becomes the dominating factor and b2
and b3 are positive and increasing in σ.
3.2 Real Firm Price in a Small Open Economy
The open economy model developed within builds on the closed economy model in Section 3.1. While the
closed economy model closely follows Gal´ı (2008), the open economy model strays due to ad hoc assumptions
given that Gal´ı’s methodology is focused primarily on monetary policy, and is agnostic to firm prices. The
goal is to observe how asset prices relate to monetary policy in a basic open economy framework, and thus
certain simplifying assumptions are used.
The open economy uses the same initial definition of real firm price:
ft =
∞∑
i=1
βjEt
[
u′(ct+j)
u′(ct)
dt+j
]
(3.1)
And the same assumption of a period utility function is used, given by:
U(Ct, Nt) =

C1−σt
1−σ − N
1−ϕ
t
1−ϕ σ 6= 1;ϕ 6= 1
C1−σt
1−σ − ln(Nt) σ 6= 1;ϕ = 1
ln(Ct)− N
1−ϕ
t
1−ϕ σ = 1;ϕ 6= 1
ln(Ct)− ln(Nt) σ = 1;ϕ = 1
⇒ u′(Ct) =
C
−σ
t σ 6= 1
1
Ct
σ = 1
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⇒ u
′(ct+j)
u′(ct)
=
(
ct+j
ct
)−σ
Marginal utility above is identical to Section 3.1, as is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for
both consumption and labour. Again, real dividends are defined as follows:
dt+j = Yt+j − Wt+j
Pt+j
Nt+j
Substituting the assumed period utility function and definition of real dividends into (3.1) results in
the following:
ft =
∞∑
i=1
βjEt
[(
ct+j
ct
)−σ (
Yt+j − Wt+j
Pt+j
Nt+j
)]
(3.2)
The same equilibrium condition as before is imposed on the labour market, but note that the previous
goods market clearing condition from Section 3.1 is not imposed:
i) Labour Market Clearing⇒ Wt+j
Pt+j
=
∂Yt+j
∂Nt+k
= (1− α)At+jN−αt+j
⇒ ft =
∞∑
i=1
βjEt
[(
ct+j
ct
)−σ (
Yt+j − (1− α)At+jN1−αt+j
)]
Due to the fact the economy is open and thus output has both a domestic component and a foreign
component, the following analysis introduces notation to differentiate certain domestic and foreign variables,
using superscript “h” for domestic variables and superscript “f” for foreign variables, for example:
Y ht+j ≡ Domestic Output
Y ft+j ≡ Foreign Output
Thus for pricing domestic firms the notation changes as follows:
⇒ fht =
∞∑
i=1
βjEt
(cht+j
cht
)−σ (
Y ht+j − (1− α)Aht+j(Nht+j)1−α
)
Instead of Gal´ı’s 3-equation framework used in the closed economy, the open economy requires both
a foreign system and a domestic system (as utilized in Appendix C). Assuming that the domestic system is
small relative to the foreign system and that foreign policy is thus agnostic to domestic shocks, the foreign
system can be modeled in a 3-equation framework that resembles the closed economy model:
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pift = βEt[pi
f
t+1] + κYˆ
f
t (C.1)
Yˆ ft = −
1
σ
(ift − Et[pift+1]− rnt ) + Et[Yˆ ft+1] (C.2)
ift = ρ+ φpipi
f
t + φyYˆ
f
t + v
f
t (C.3)
The foreign policy shock follows an AR(1) process, where ρv ∈ [0, 1):
vft = ρvv
f
t−1 + 
vf
t
The foreign system in the open economy is built on the same underlying assumptions and mechanics
as the closed economy system. Households are infinitely-lived and utility maximizing agents allocating
consumption across a continuum of goods. The goods market only considers a final goods sector, and thus
only final goods are traded implicitly. Imperfect competition is introduced by the assumption that firms
produce differentiated goods with identical technology, with firms facing an isoelastic demand schedule from
households and setting prices following a Calvo pricing mechanism with the probability of being able to adjust
prices set to 1− θ. Calvo pricing introduces price stickiness as only select firms can reset prices periodically.
The 3-equation framework for the domestic system is unique in terms of the monetary policy equation:
piht = βEt[pi
h
t+1] + κYˆ
h
t (C.6)
Yˆ ht = −
1
σ
(iht − Et[piht+1]− rnt ) + Et[Yˆ ht+1] (C.7)
iht = ρ+ φ
h
pipi
h
t + φ
h
y Yˆ
h
t + φ
f
pipi
f
t + φ
f
y Yˆ
f
t + v
h
t (C.8)
The NKPC in (C.6) and the DIS in (C.7) are identical to the closed economy model as well as the
aforementioned foreign system in the open economy model, and thus include the same underlying assumptions.
The difference is that since the economy is now open and the foreign economy is large relative to the domestic
economy, domestic policy should not be agnostic to foreign shocks and should respond in some fashion. In
addition to responding to domestic inflation and the domestic output gap, in the absence of an explicit and
rigorous model for trade and exchange rates, the ad hoc assumption is made that the domestic policy function
in (C.8) takes the form of a Taylor-type policy function modified to respond directly to foreign inflation and
the foreign output gap. The motivation is that under the assumption that the domestic economy is small
and open, foreign inflation and foreign output gaps will have a meaningful impact on the domestic economy
as the foreign system makes up the bulk of aggregate demand in the open economy.
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For example, where φfy > 0, consider a scenario where actual foreign GDP is in excess of potential
GDP and thus there is a foreign output gap (Yˆ ft > 0). Since the domestic economy is assumed to be small,
the corollary is that the foreign economy determines the overwhelming majority of aggregate demand. Since
the economy is open, excess aggregate demand from the foreign output gap will spill into the domestic
system via trade (implicitly in this model), and will have the same effects as excess demand domestically
such as pushing domestic prices higher. By having the domestic policy function in (C.8) respond directly to
the foreign output gap, all else equal the domestic policymaker in this example will raise domestic nominal
interest rates in a contractionary manner to counteract the excess aggregate demand, even though it is from
the foreign economy.
The domestic policy shock also follows an AR(1) process, with the same ρv ∈ [0, 1):
vht = ρvv
h
t−1 + 
vh
t
Domestic consumption will equal domestic income in equilibrium, but now domestic income will have
three components: domestic labour income, the domestic share of domestic capital income, and the domestic
share of foreign capital income — thus foreign capital income imputed into domestic consumption intro-
duces the potential for impact of foreign assets on domestic income. For this purpose, domestic ownership
of domestic capital and foreign capital are both key to representing domestic income and thus domestic
consumption.
kht ≡ the share of domestic capital owned domestically
kft ≡ the share of foreign capital owned domestically
⇒ cht =
Wht
Pht
Nht + k
h
t [Y
h
t − (1− α)Aht (Nht )1−α]
+ kft [Y
f
t − (1− α)Aft (Nft )1−α]
= (1− α)Aht (Nht )1−α + kht [Y ht − (1− α)Aht (Nht )1−α]
+ kft [Y
f
t − (1− α)Aft (Nft )1−α]
The same approximation is used for the relationship between aggregate output, employment, and
technology, as before from Gal´ı (2008):
Yt ≈ AtN1−αt
⇒ Nt ≈
(
Yt
At
) 1
1−α
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However, now the definition must be partitioned to distinguish domestic and foreign contributions such
that:
⇒ cht ≈ (1− α)Y ht + kht (αY ht ) + kft (αY ft )
=
[
1− α(1− kht )
]
Y ht + αk
f
t Y
f
t
Since the result will be calibrated around a steady state, assume that levels of capital ownership are
constant over time, such that kht = k
h
t+j = k1 and k
f
t = k
f
t+j = k2, while setting µ1 = (1 − α(1 − k1))
and µ2 = αk2, the result is an equation for domestic consumption which clearly delineates proportional
contributions from domestic and foreign output:
⇒ cht ≈ µ1Y ht + µ2Y ft (3.14)
Additionally, using the approximate relationship between aggregate output, employment, and technol-
ogy, the equation for firm prices simplifies to:
⇒ fht ≈
∞∑
i=1
βjEt
(cht+j
cht
)−σ (
αY ht+j
) (3.15)
Combining (3.14) and (3.15):
⇒ fht ≈ α
∞∑
i=1
βjEt
[(
µ1Y
h
t + µ2Y
f
t
µ1(Y ht+j) + µ2Y
f
t+j
)σ
Y ht+j
]
(3.16)
In order to linearize (3.16) around the steady state, the following assumption will be made about the
steady state level of output:
Y¯ ht = Y¯
h
t+j = Y¯
Y¯ ft = Y¯
f
t+j = uY¯
Essentially, assume that the steady state value of foreign output is proportional to the steady state
value for domestic output, and the coefficient “u” reflects such proportionality. For example, if the steady
state value of foreign output is 2 times larger than the domestic economy’s output, then u = 2. Alternatively,
one could conceptualized foreign output as representing the rest of the global economy and thus “u” can
reflect the scale factor which depends on the size of the domestic economy relative to the global economy. If
the domestic economy represents 10% of global output, then one would set u = 9 as the domestic economy
represents 11+u of the global economy.
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In order to solve the sum in (3.16), a second-order Taylor approximation around the steady state value
of output will be used. Let Y = (Y ht , Y
h
t+k, Y
f
t , Y
f
t+j) such that:
(
µ1Y
h
t + µ2Y
f
t
µ1(Y ht+j) + µ2Y
f
t+j
)σ
Y ht+j = F (Y
h
t , Y
h
t+k, Y
f
t , Y
f
t+j) = F (Y)
Then write (3.16) in terms of F (Y):
⇒ fht ≈ α
∞∑
i=1
βjEt [F (Y)] (3.17)
Thus the approximation becomes (see Appendix D for detailed approximation):
F (Y) ≈ Y¯ + σµ1
µ1 + µ2u
(Y ht − Y¯ ) +
σµ2
µ1 + µ2u
(Y ft − uY¯ )
+
(
µ1 + µ2u− σµ1
µ1 + µ2u
)
(Y ht+j − Y¯ )−
σµ2
µ1 + µ2u
(Y ft+j − uY¯ )
+
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ21
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ht − Y¯ )2
+
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ22
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ft − uY¯ )2
+
1
2
(
σµ1(σµ1 − µ1 − 2µ2u
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ht+j − Y¯ )2
+
1
2
(
σ(σ + 1)µ22
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ft+j − uY¯ )2
+
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ1µ2
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ht − Y¯ )(Y ft − uY¯ )
+
1
2
(
σµ1(µ1 + µ2u− σµ1)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ht − Y¯ )(Y ht+j − Y¯ )
− 1
2
(
σ2µ1µ2
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ht − Y¯ )(Y ft+j − uY¯ )
+
1
2
(
σµ2(µ1 + µ2u− σµ1)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ft − uY¯ )(Y ht+j − Y¯ )
− 1
2
(
σ2µ22
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ft − uY¯ )(Y ft+j − uY¯ )
+
1
2
(
σµ2(σµ1 − µ2u)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ht+j − Y¯ )(Y ft+j − uY¯ )
(3.18)
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Where Y¯ is the steady state value of domestic output one can express the domestic output gap as
Yˆ ht =
Y ht −Y¯
(Y¯ )
and where uY¯ is the steady state value of foreign output the foreign output gap can be expressed
as Yˆ ft =
Y ft −uY¯
(uY¯ )
. Combining (3.17) and (3.18) and writing in terms of respective output gaps results in a
second-order approximation for firm price in terms of the macroeconomic parameters and the domestic and
foreign output gaps:
ft ≈ αY¯
∞∑
j=1
βjEt
[
1 +
σµ1
µ1 + µ2u
Yˆ ht +
σµ2u
µ1 + µ2u
Yˆ ft
+
(
µ1 + µ2u− σµ1
µ1 + µ2u
)
Yˆ ht+j −
σµ2u
µ1 + µ2u
Yˆ ft+j +
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ21
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(Yˆ ht )
2
+
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ22u2
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(Yˆ ft )
2 +
1
2
(
σµ1(σµ1 − µ1 − 2µ2u)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(Yˆ ht+j)
2
+
1
2
(
σ(σ + 1)µ22u
2
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(Yˆ ft+j)
2 +
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ1µ2u
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Yˆ ht Yˆ
f
t
+
1
2
(
σµ1(µ1 + µ2u− σµ1)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Yˆ ht Yˆ
h
t+j −
1
2
(
σ2µ1µ2u
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Yˆ ht Yˆ
f
t+j
+
1
2
(
σµ2(µ1 + µ2u− σµ1)u
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Yˆ ft Yˆ
h
t+j −
1
2
(
σ2µ22u
2
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Yˆ ft Yˆ
f
t+j
+
1
2
(
σµ2u(σµ1 − µ2u)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Yˆ ht+j Yˆ
f
t+j
]
(3.19)
Next using the results from Appendix C which expresses the output gaps, Yˆ ft and Yˆ
h
t , in terms of their
respective monetary policy shocks:
Yˆ ft = ψyvv
f
t = −(1− βρv)Λfvft (C.4)
Yˆ ht = ψ
h
yvv
h
t + ψ
f
yvv
f
t = −(1− βρv)Λhvht + (1− βρv)ΛhΛf (φfpiκ+ φfy(1− βρv))vft (C.17)
The equation (3.19) can be written in terms of the domestic and foreign policy shocks which are left in
terms of ψyv, ψ
h
yv, and ψ
f
yv to keep the notation clearer for collecting terms:
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ft ≈ αY¯
∞∑
j=1
βjEt
[
1 +
σµ1
µ1 + µ2u
(ψhyvv
h
t + ψ
f
yvv
f
t ) +
σµ2u
µ1 + µ2u
ψyvv
f
t
+
(
µ1 + µ2u− σµ1
µ1 + µ2u
)
(ψhyvv
h
t+j + ψ
f
yvv
f
t+j)−
σµ2u
µ1 + µ2u
ψyvv
f
t+j
+
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ21
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψhyvv
h
t + ψ
f
yvv
f
t )
2
+
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ22u2
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψyvv
f
t )
2
+
1
2
(
σµ1(σµ1 − µ1 − 2µ2u)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψhyvv
h
t+j + ψ
f
yvv
f
t+j)
2
+
1
2
(
σ(σ + 1)µ22u
2
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψyvv
f
t+j)
2
+
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ1µ2u
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψyvv
f
t (ψ
h
yvv
h
t + ψ
f
yvv
f
t )
+
1
2
(
σµ1(µ1 + µ2u− σµ1)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψhyvv
h
t + ψ
f
yvv
f
t )(ψ
h
yvv
h
t+j + ψ
f
yvv
f
t+j)
− 1
2
(
σ2µ1µ2u
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψhyvv
h
t + ψ
f
yvv
f
t )ψyvv
f
t+j
+
1
2
(
σµ2(µ1 + µ2u− σµ1)u
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψyvv
f
t (ψ
h
yvv
h
t+j + ψ
f
yvv
f
t+j)
− 1
2
(
σ2µ22u
2
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψyv)
2vft v
f
t+j
+
1
2
(
σµ2u(σµ1 − µ2u)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψhyvv
h
t+j + ψ
f
yvv
f
t+j)ψyvv
f
t+j
]
(3.20)
As shown in detail in Appendix E, (3.20) can be expressed in terms of first-order and second-order
terms for each shock, where the zi below represent coefficients that are a collection of the parameters that
come from grouping terms in (3.20):
ft ≈ αY¯
∞∑
j=1
βjEt
[
1 + z1v
h
t + z2v
f
t + z3v
h
t+j + z4v
f
t+j + z5(v
h
t )
2
+ z6(v
f
t )
2 + z7(v
h
t+j)
2 + z8(v
f
t+j)
2 + z9v
h
t v
f
t + z10v
h
t+jv
f
t+j
+ z11v
f
t v
h
t+j + z12v
f
t v
f
t+j + z13v
h
t v
h
t+j + z14v
h
t v
f
t+j
]
(3.21)
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Working through the summation results in the following linear equation for firm prices (see Appendix
E for more detail):
⇒ ft ≈ αY¯
[ β
1− β +
β
1− β z1v
h
t +
β
1− β z2v
f
t (3.22)
+
βρv
1− βρv z3v
h
t +
βρv
1− βρv z4v
f
t +
β
1− β z5(v
h
t )
2 +
β
1− β z6(v
f
t )
2
+ z7
[
(vht )
2
(
βρ2v
1− βρ2v
)
+ (σh )
2
(
β
(1− β)(1− ρ2vβ)
)]
+ z8
[
(vft )
2
(
βρ2v
1− βρ2v
)
+ (σf )
2
(
β
(1− β)(1− ρ2vβ)
)]
+
β
1− β z9v
h
t v
f
t
+ z10
[(
βρ2v
1− βρ2v
)
vht v
f
t +
β
(1− β)(1− ρ2vβ)
σh,f
]
+
(
βρv
1− βρv
)
z11v
f
t v
h
t
+
(
βρv
1− βρv
)
z12(v
f
t )
2 +
(
βρv
1− βρv
)
z13(v
h
t )
2 +
(
βρv
1− βρv
)
z14v
f
t v
h
t
]
In order to more clearly illustrate the linear equation, terms can be grouped with respect to first-order
and second-order effects of the various shocks, including interactions, and thus the open economy result can
be written in the same format as the closed economy result, but with more terms given the influence of
foreign monetary policy shocks and corresponding interactions. Additionally, most of the bi terms are now
much more complex with significantly more parameters embedded, though the first four terms are optically
similar to Section 3.1 (see Appendix E for more detail, including each bi):
⇒ ft ≈ b0 + b1vht + b2(vht )2 + b3(σh )2 + b4vft + b5(vft )2 (3.23)
+ b6(σ
f
 )
2 + b7v
h
t v
f
t + b8σh,f
The result is a linear equation approximating real firm price as a function of the domestic monetary
policy shock vht , the square of the domestic monetary policy shock (v
h
t )
2, the variance of the error term from
the domestic monetary policy shock (σh )
2, the foreign monetary policy shock vft , the square of the foreign
monetary policy shock (vft )
2, the variance of the error term from the foreign monetary policy shock (σf )
2,
the interaction between the domestic and foreign monetary policy shock vht v
f
t , and correlation of the error
term in the domestic and foreign monetary policy functions denoted σh,f .
The next step is to calibrate the model, using several of the same assumptions as Section 3.1:
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Table 3.3: Summary Calibration Parameters — Open Economy
Parameter Assumed Value
β 0.99
α 13
 6
ϕ 1
θ 23
ρv 0.5
φpi = φ
f
pi = φ
h
y 1.5
φy = φ
f
y = φ
h
y
1
8
λ 0.17
κ 0.17σ + 0.34
Λh = Λf 10.4225σ+0.403125
Notably the simplifying assumption has been made that the interest rate rule coefficients are the same
in the domestic and foreign economy, that is φpi = φ
f
pi = φ
h
y and φy = φ
f
y = φ
h
y . Despite the simplifying
assumptions, this is a point of departure compared with the closed economy model because now in addition
to σ there is also k1 and k2 as choice variables — capital ownership now matters. In theory, an attempt
could be made to solve for the asset allocation of domestic and foreign households from Euler equations
describing utility maximization, but such a solution would require assumptions about forward-looking return
expectations from investing in firms and would thus require a formulation of expectations of future firm
prices.
In practice, the equity “home bias” is a well documented anomaly whereby actual empirical asset
allocations of households cannot be reconciled with optimizing household behavior in an open economy. The
equity home bias was initially discussed in French and Poterba (1991) which identified that investors hold the
overwhelming majority of their wealth domestically, consistent across all five of the largest stock markets in
the world at the time (United States; Japan; United Kingdom; Germany; and France) despite generally well
known and accepted benefits of international diversification. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) reinforce the result,
finding that home bias occurs even within the United States as domestic investment managers empirically
prefer firms with local headquarters — illustrating that the home bias anomaly occurs not only between
national borders but also within national borders. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) delineates equity home bias as
one of The Six Major Puzzles in International Macroeconomics. While there are proposed explanations such
as the information immobility discussed in Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009), a satisfactory solution
has not been widely accepted and the anomaly is still not well understood. For a more thorough discussion
of the home bias anomaly and associated literature, see Lewis (1999) and Karolyi and Stulz (2003).
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Instead of attempting to prove or disprove home bias, assumptions can be made in order to exemplify
a few distinct asset allocations for domestic and foreign households, including a hypothetical asset allocation
consistent with home bias and one contradictory to home bias, and each asset allocation can be calibrated.
Assuming that the amount of domestic and foreign capital is distributed proportional to output and that the
combined amount of capital owned domestically — which consists of domestic capital owned domestically and
foreign capital owned domestically — will be similarly proportional to the domestic economy’s size relative
to global output such that:
1 = k1 + uk2 (3.24)
For the purpose of illustration, assume u = 9, and thus the small open domestic economy is 10% of
global output, then a few pairs (k1,k2) can be chosen that satisfy (3.24) in order to illustrate three separate
hypothetical scenarios:
k1 = 0.10, k2 = 0.10 (3.25)
k1 = 0.95, k2 =
1− 0.95
9
= 0.005˙ (3.26)
k1 = 0.01, k2 =
1− 0.01
9
= 0.11 (3.27)
(3.25) is a baseline scenario with balanced capital ownership (such that k1 = k2 =
1
1+u ); (3.26) is a
scenario illustrating relatively high domestic ownership of domestic capital and correspondingly low domestic
ownership of foreign capital, consistent with a degree of home bias; and (3.27) illustrates relatively low
domestic ownership of domestic capital which is compensated by higher domestic ownership of foreign capital
— this could be conceptualized as a “hedging” economy where domestic agents seek to diversify away from
exposure to the domestic economy via disproportionate allocations of capital to foreign assets, which is
essentially the opposite of home bias and is used to illustrate the contrast. The following three tables
illustrate the results of the assumptions in (3.25), (3.26), and (3.27) respectively:
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Table 3.4: Calibration Summary — Open Economy (k1 = 0.1, k2 = 0.1)
σ b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8
0 33Y¯ 0.33Y¯ 0 0 0.58Y¯ 0 0 0 0
0.25 33Y¯ −5.46Y¯ −1.48Y¯ −4.25Y¯ 5.22Y¯ −1.81Y¯ −5.80Y¯ 3.08Y¯ 10.45Y¯
0.5 33Y¯ −9.28Y¯ −1.35Y¯ −4.93Y¯ 7.21Y¯ −1.35Y¯ −5.53Y¯ 2.52Y¯ 11.35Y¯
0.75 33Y¯ −12.00Y¯ −0.74Y¯ −4.39Y¯ 8.12Y¯ −0.63Y¯ −4.25Y¯ −1.26Y¯ 9.86Y¯
1.0 33Y¯ −14.03Y¯ 0 −3.45Y¯ 8.52Y¯ 0 −2.98Y¯ 0.01Y¯ 7.90Y¯
1.5 33Y¯ −16.89Y¯ 1.43Y¯ −1.37Y¯ 8.69Y¯ 0.92Y¯ −1.02Y¯ −2.00Y¯ 4.27Y¯
2.0 33Y¯ −18.82Y¯ 2.63Y¯ 0.50Y¯ 8.57Y¯ 1.50Y¯ 0.26Y¯ −3.42Y¯ 1.50Y¯
2.5 33Y¯ −20.23Y¯ 3.61Y¯ 2.07Y¯ 8.36Y¯ 1.88Y¯ 1.12Y¯ −4.42Y¯ −0.58Y¯
3.0 33Y¯ −21.31Y¯ 4.41Y¯ 3.37Y¯ 8.14Y¯ 2.14Y¯ 1.72Y¯ −5.14Y¯ −2.15Y¯
3.5 33Y¯ −22.17Y¯ 5.06Y¯ 4.45Y¯ 7.93Y¯ 2.33Y¯ 2.16Y¯ −5.69Y¯ −3.36Y¯
Table 3.5: Calibration Summary — Open Economy (k1 = 0.95, k2 = 0.005˙)
σ b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8
0 33Y¯ 0.33Y¯ 0 0 0.58Y¯ 0 0 0 0
0.25 33Y¯ −7.81Y¯ −2.93Y¯ −4.09Y¯ 10.45Y¯ −4.53Y¯ −6.44Y¯ 7.28Y¯ 10.27Y¯
0.5 33Y¯ −13.17Y¯ −2.68Y¯ −3.82Y¯ 15.44Y¯ −3.43Y¯ −5.04Y¯ 6.06Y¯ 8.78Y¯
0.75 33Y¯ −16.98Y¯ −1.46Y¯ −2.22Y¯ 18.26Y¯ −1.62Y¯ −2.60Y¯ 3.08Y¯ 4.81Y¯
1.0 33Y¯ −19.84Y¯ 0 −0.27Y¯ 19.97Y¯ 0 −0.40Y¯ 0 0.67Y¯
1.5 33Y¯ −23.86Y¯ 2.82Y¯ 3.52Y¯ 21.81Y¯ 2.35Y¯ 2.82Y¯ −5.15Y¯ −6.29Y¯
2.0 33Y¯ −26.57Y¯ 5.19Y¯ 6.71Y¯ 22.69Y¯ 3.83Y¯ 4.85Y¯ −8.92Y¯ −11.41Y¯
2.5 33Y¯ −28.55Y¯ 7.12Y¯ 9.31Y¯ 23.14Y¯ 4.80Y¯ 6.19Y¯ −11.69Y¯ −15.17Y¯
3.0 33Y¯ −30.06Y¯ 8.69Y¯ 11.43Y¯ 23.39Y¯ 5.46Y¯ 7.10Y¯ −13.77Y¯ −18.01Y¯
3.5 33Y¯ −31.28Y¯ 9.99Y¯ 13.18Y¯ 23.53Y¯ 5.93Y¯ 7.75Y¯ −15.38Y¯ −20.21Y¯
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Table 3.6: Calibration Summary — Open Economy (k1 = 0.01, k2 = 0.11)
σ b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8
0 33Y¯ 0.33Y¯ 0 0 0.58Y¯ 0 0 0 0
0.25 33Y¯ −5.21Y¯ −1.36Y¯ −4.21Y¯ 4.67Y¯ −1.63Y¯ −5.49Y¯ 2.74Y¯ 10.24Y¯
0.5 33Y¯ −8.87Y¯ −1.24Y¯ −4.94Y¯ 6.34Y¯ −1.22Y¯ −5.23Y¯ 2.23Y¯ 11.27Y¯
0.75 33Y¯ −11.47Y¯ −0.67Y¯ −4.49Y¯ 7.04Y¯ −0.58Y¯ −4.00Y¯ 1.12Y¯ 9.98Y¯
1.0 33Y¯ −13.42Y¯ 0 −3.63Y¯ 7.30Y¯ 0 −2.79Y¯ 0.01Y¯ 8.20Y¯
1.5 33Y¯ −16.15Y¯ 1.31Y¯ −1.70Y¯ 7.30Y¯ 0.84Y¯ −0.92Y¯ −1.75Y¯ −4.87Y¯
2.0 33Y¯ −18.00Y¯ 2.41Y¯ 0.05Y¯ 7.07Y¯ 1.38Y¯ 0.31Y¯ −2.97Y¯ 2.31Y¯
2.5 33Y¯ −19.35Y¯ 3.31Y¯ 1.52Y¯ 6.79Y¯ 1.74Y¯ 1.13Y¯ −3.83Y¯ 0.40Y¯
3.0 33Y¯ −20.38Y¯ 4.04Y¯ 2.74Y¯ 6.52Y¯ 2.00Y¯ 1.71Y¯ −4.45Y¯ −1.05Y¯
3.5 33Y¯ −21.21Y¯ 4.64Y¯ 3.76Y¯ 6.27Y¯ 2.18Y¯ 2.13Y¯ −4.91Y¯ −2.18Y¯
Before interpreting the results, it is imperative to recall the assumptions made in Appendix C relating
to the monetary policy shocks: foreign monetary policy illustrated in (C.3) is agnostic to domestic shocks
because the domestic economy is small relative to the foreign economy, while domestic monetary policy
illustrated in (C.8) takes into account foreign shocks:
ift = ρ+ φpipi
f
t + φyYˆ
f
t + v
f
t (C.3)
iht = ρ+ φ
h
pipi
h
t + φ
h
y Yˆ
h
t + φ
f
pipi
f
t + φ
f
y Yˆ
f
t + v
h
t (C.8)
The first four coefficients, b0 to b3, can be compared directly to the results found in the closed economy
in Section 3.1. Clearly, b0 has not changed as it constitutes parameters that are identical in both the closed
economy and open economy models — it is still the present value of a perpetuity where the coupon or dividend
payment is the firm’s share of steady state output in the economy, proportional to Y¯ , and is only a function
of β which is unchanged. It should be noted that the scenario with relatively high domestic ownership of
domestic capital in Table 3.5 closely resembles the approximated results for b0 to b3 in Section 3.1.
The coefficient b1 still represents the first-order effect of the domestic monetary policy shock, now
denoted vht , on firm prices in the economy. The shock v
h
t is still introduced into the model via the domestic
output gap, Yˆ ht , and is negatively related with the output gap while autoregressive in nature, thus positive
shocks decrease output in a persistent fashion. The same phenomenon is observed where b1 is decreasing
in σ and positively related to the EIS. However, universally higher b1 coefficients are observed — that is,
less negative values — in the first and third specifications, Table 3.4 with balanced capital ownership and
Table 3.6 with relatively low domestic capital ownership and high foreign capital ownership. Recall that in
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Section 3.1 the negative b1 coefficient was driven by distortions in the path of consumption caused by the
monetary policy shock’s impact on the periodic output gap. The same mechanism describes b1 in the open
economy context, but now the consumption path is also driven by foreign capital income which is proportional
to domestic ownership of foreign capital, k2, and foreign capital income is independent of domestic shocks
thus it dampens the impact of domestic shocks — the independent foreign capital income stream stabilizes
domestic consumption. Since k1 and k2 are inversely related, the specification in Table 3.5 with high domestic
capital ownership produces b1 coefficients relatively close in value to the closed economy results in Section
3.1.
Despite the fact the open economy model has introduced foreign assets via foreign capital income, the
same two competing effects are still simultaneously observed: the risk aversion component associated with
the investment decision and a prudence component associated with the savings decision — there are still no
risk-free assets and though there is an alternative foreign asset, domestic ownership of foreign assets is held
at a constant level in each scenario (e.g. k2). The open economy b2, the second-order effect of the domestic
monetary policy shock, still exhibits the same zeros at σ = 0 and σ = 1, while b3, the second-order effect of
the domestic policy shock’s variance, exhibits a zero at σ = 0 but not at σ = 1.
For b2, the coefficient on (v
h
t )
2: at σ = 0 no risk aversion on the investment component and no
prudence on the savings component are observed; from 0 < σ < 1 the effect of risk aversion is observed,
which is strongest at high values of k1 (correspondingly low values for k2) — in other words, there is a
diversification benefit from higher levels of domestic ownership of foreign capital (higher k2) which does not
exist in Section 3.1; and the open economy b2 is persistently lower (a less positive effect) for σ > 1 than the
closed economy, especially for low k1. In Section 3.1, prudence becomes the dominating factor for σ > 1
which is similar here as b2 is still increasing in σ but at a slower rate than in 3.1 — the strength of the
prudence effect on b2 appears to be lowered by high foreign capital ownership.
The second-order effect of the error variance of the domestic monetary policy shock, (σh )
2, as measured
by b3, is universally lower for σ > 0 than in Section 3.1. The high domestic capital scenario produces b3
coefficients relatively close to in 3.1 across all σ, while the high foreign capital scenario produces generally
lower values of b3. The explanation for lower b3 is likely a combination of the the investment component, as
foreign capital introduces diversification, and differences in prudence as foreign capital income reduces the
demand for self-insurance via ownership of domestic assets. Consistently, relatively high b3 is observed where
k1 is relatively high (less foreign capital income) and low b3 where k1 is low (more foreign capital income).
The remaining coefficients, b4 through b8, are unique to the open economy model and thus cannot be
directly compared to the results in Section 3.1. The coefficient b4 measures the first-order effect of the foreign
monetary policy shock denoted vft . Notably, domestic assets respond differently to a foreign monetary policy
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shock than to a domestic monetary policy shock, as illustrated by the stark contrast between universally
positive values for b4 and predominantly negative values of b1. In order to understand the mechanism for a
seemingly anomalous result on the surface, one must trace the way foreign monetary policy shocks feed into
the domestic system using relationships in Appendix C:
Yˆ ft = ψ
f
yvv
f
t = −(1− βρv)Λfvft (C.4)
Similar to the domestic shock, the foreign shock is negatively related to the foreign output gap Yˆ ft , thus
a positive shock implies a negative foreign output gap. Unlike the foreign policy function which is agnostic
to domestic shocks, domestic policy actually responds to foreign shocks as denoted in (C.8):
iht = ρ+ φ
h
pipi
h
t + φ
h
y Yˆ
h
t + φ
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f
y Yˆ
f
t + v
h
t (C.8)
Thus, all else equal, because of the fact domestic policy responds to foreign policy shocks, a positive
foreign policy shock actually leads to a decrease in domestic interest rates, which then feeds into (C.7):
Yˆ ht = −
1
σ
(iht − Et[piht+1]− rnt ) + Et[Yˆ ht+1] (C.7)
The decrease in domestic interest rates in turn begets a positive domestic output gap, and as observed
in Section 3.1, the periodic output gap leads to distortions in the stochastic discount factor. Instead of a
negative output gap decreasing the stochastic discount factor as in 3.1 (the denominator, Ct, drops more
than the numerator, Ct+j), b4 illustrates the fact a foreign policy shock leads to a positive domestic output
gap which in turn increases the stochastic discount factor in a manner where the magnitude of the increase is
positively related to σ. However, since the economy is open there is also a secondary competing effect which
comes from the fact that the path of domestic consumption is in part a function of foreign capital income
— in isolation, the foreign policy shock which resulted in a negative foreign output gap, Yˆ ft , will result in
persistently lower domestic foreign capital income due to the autoregressive nature of the shock, and this
effect will partially offset the effect of the aforementioned positive domestic output gap in a manner which
depends on the levels of domestic and foreign capital ownership — this effect in isolation is similar to the
result for the first-order effect of the domestic policy shock measured by b1 in Section 3.1, except for the
fact the effect represents only a fraction of domestic income. Correspondingly, relatively large b4 coefficients
are observed which increase in σ for the scenario with low domestic ownership of foreign capital specified
in Table 3.5, as the consumption impact from foreign capital income is relatively low. In the specifications
in Table 3.4 and Table 3.6, it is clearer to see the competing effect of the consumption impact from foreign
capital income, as the specification in 3.4 results in a b4 coefficient that begins decreasing after σ > 1.5, and
the specification in Table 3.6 results in a b4 coefficient which peaks between 1 < σ < 1.5 (b4 is approximately
equal at σ = 1 and σ = 1.5). Ultimately b4 suggests that if the domestic policy function responds to negative
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foreign output gaps with domestic monetary stimulus, the observation is a first-order effect of the foreign
policy shock whereby domestic asset prices are inflated by the stimulus. For a positive foreign output gap
and corresponding monetary tightening, domestic asset prices would deflate.
The second-order effect of the foreign monetary policy shock, (vft )
2, behaves similarly to the domestic
policy shock with competing effects from the investment decision and savings decision. For σ = 0 there is
no risk aversion on the investment component and no prudence on the saving component, thus b5 = 0; for
0 < σ < 1, b5 is negative but increasing due to increasing importance of prudence as σ increases; finally
for σ > 1 prudence begins to dominate as b5 is both positive for σ > 1 and increasing in σ. Notably b5 is
largest in magnitude for the scenario with low foreign capital ownership in Table 3.5 which can be thought
of as higher risk premiums on domestic assets where the investment decision dominates from 0 < σ < 1,
and stronger prudence effects for σ > 1 where the savings decision dominates. The result is intuitive given
the framework, as low foreign capital ownership implies less diversification of capital income which in turn
is consistent with asset concentration leading to higher risk premiums or a higher risk aversion effect on the
investment decision for domestic assets as well as a higher value of prudence as less diversified capital income
increases the motive for agents to self-insure.
The second-order effect of the foreign policy shock’s error variance, (σf )
2, is captured in the coefficient
b6, and follows a similar pattern as the coefficient b3. At σ = 0, b6 = 0 as there is no risk aversion on the
investment component and no prudence on the saving component, and b6 increases in σ becoming positive
at higher values of σ. Similar to the findings with b5, b6 is largest in magnitude for the scenario with low
foreign capital ownership for similar reasons mentioned above.
The last two coefficients, b7 and b8, measure interaction effects of the two policy functions. The second-
order interaction effect between the domestic policy shock and the foreign policy shock is measured by b7,
while b8 captures the second-order effect of the covariance between the errors of the two policy functions.
The fact that the domestic policy function has been set up to respond countercyclically to foreign shocks
is likely playing a role in the interaction terms. Directionally, the behavior of b7 is roughly the opposite
pattern of the second-order effect of each policy shock individually, as b7 = 0 for σ = 0, but then b7 is
positive but decreasing from 0 < σ < 1, reaching b7 ≈ 0 at σ = 1 and then continues to decrease in σ for
σ > 1. The result for b8 is interesting as it suggests that positive correlations between the policy functions
increase domestic firm prices for lower values of σ but decrease domestic firm prices for higher values of σ,
or conversely that negative correlations between the policy functions increase domestic firm prices for higher
values of σ but decrease domestic firm prices for lower values of σ. Notably, this effect varies based on the
mix of domestic capital ownership as b8 is negative at σ = 1.5 for the relatively high domestic ownership of
domestic capital scenario in Table 3.5 whereas b8 is first negative at σ = 3 for the relatively low domestic
ownership of domestic capital scenario in Table 3.6.
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4Conclusion
The first-order observations from the calibration of the ad hoc open economy model are logical and
consistent with modern macroeconomic thought. Positive monetary policy shocks defined as vht > 0 are
consistent with higher nominal interest rates, or monetary tightening, as expressed in (C.8) which all-else-
equal cools the domestic economy by decreasing the domestic output gap and in turn leads to lower domestic
firm prices — conversely negative policy shocks (vht < 0) are stimulative, all-else-equal increase the domestic
output gap, and in turn lead to higher domestic firm prices. The observed negative relationship between
domestic firm prices and domestic nominal interest rates and the positive relationship between domestic
firm prices and the domestic output gap both seem to reconcile with what is intuitively expected. Domestic
inflation should have the same positive relationship with firm prices, similar to the domestic output gap, as
domestic inflation feeds into the policy function in (C.8) in the same manner as the output gap. The negative
relationship between domestic firm prices and the foreign output gap is intuitive once it is understood that
the mechanism driving the process is the domestic policy function which reacts countercyclically to foreign
output gaps and foreign inflation by design. The suggestion of this mechanism is that when faced with
a global recession, a policymaker acting countercyclically in a small open economy will end up propping
up domestic firm prices via such countercyclical policy intervention — an intriguing result that is worth
additional investigation in the future given the actual policy interventions over the past decade, especially
since the appreciation in firm prices is driven by household preferences as reflected in the stochastic discount
factor instead of macroeconomic fundamentals such as higher productivity and higher dividends.
The competing risk aversion and prudence components picked up in second-order effects are harder to
interpret but also seem to reconcile with macroeconomic theory, though a richer model would allow for cleaner
interpretation. Households in both the closed economy and open economy models are observed to exhibit
risk aversion which varies with σ and is counterbalanced by the fact second-order effects conflate prudence
and risk aversion. Prudence also varies with σ, as the degree to which households seek self-insurance depends
on their risk aversion and the volatility of expected future income. Adding alternative methods of savings
might help tease out prudence more distinctly.
While the preceding section suggests that it is possible to combine New Keynesian macroeconomics with
consumption based asset pricing, and approximate and calibrate the resulting model around a non-stochastic
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steady state, even a basic model quickly runs into limitations of complexity in the derivation, estimation,
and interpretation. As a proof-of-concept in embedding a New Keynesian model for the economy within a
consumption based asset pricing model, there is clearly substantial room for improvement and further study
across a variety of dimensions. Importantly, a second-order Taylor approximation (or potentially higher-
order) allows for a “brute force” locally approximated solution regardless of how complex the model —
this means a similar type of approximation is possible by following similar steps, even for a much richer
model with significantly more terms. Potential dimensions for extension include the inclusion of another
mechanism for intertemporal savings such as money or a bond market, or alternatively allowing levels of
domestic and foreign capital to vary at the choice of individual agents making a dynamic asset allocation
decision, adding habit formation to the utility function as studied in Campbell and Cochrane (1999), adding
an explicit model for trade with components such as exchange rates and intermediate goods, or conducting
a higher-order approximation and calibration. Further, more rigor could be added by calibrating based on
empirical parameters of an actual economy instead of a hypothetical small open economy.
In the New Keynesian DSGE framework, it is imperative to accurately model decision-making at the
individual agent level in order to provide rich microfoundations. Adding an alternative method of saving to
complement investing in risky-assets, or firms, could help parse second-order effects between risk premiums
and prudence. Habit formation could improve the richness of the utility function, and ultimately the results
derived from the utility function. A higher-order approximation would provide results closer to the actual
functional form that is being approximated. The trade-off of all of the aforementioned factors would be the
exponentially increasing complexity of any such approximation and estimation. An explicit model for trade
would similarly improve the foundations of the model while also allowing for a more realistic understanding
of how shocks and policy transmit between open economies.
The concept of combining a New Keynesian DSGE model with conventional consumption-based asset
pricing continues to tease a compelling possibility. Indeed, as the proof-of-concept the opportunity for
extension is the most interesting part of the ad hoc open economy model — though the model is far from
a complete model, it seems to have a solid foundation and should prove an important direction for further
study. As illustrated in Section 3.2, the potentially complex relationships between domestic and foreign
monetary policy could have profound impacts on asset prices in a New Keynesian paradigm. A lack of proper
understanding of the potential asset market distortions that follow from monetary policy shocks could lead
to unintended consequences in asset markets. Similarly, more developed asset pricing models built to be
consistent with a New Keynesian paradigm could allow for complex ex-post analysis of monetary policy,
monetary regime changes, and structural macroeconomic shifts.
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Appendix A
A Closed Economy New Keynesian Output Gap
In this Appendix we will derive the New Keynesian output gap in terms of the model’s monetary policy
shock and parameters in a closed economy.
pit = βEt[pit+1] + κYˆt (A.1)
Yˆt = − 1
σ
(it − Et[pit+1]− rnt ) + Et[Yˆt+1] (A.2)
it = ρ+ φpipit + φyYˆt + vt (A.3)
Equation (A.1) is the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC), equation (A.2) is the dynamic IS equation
(DIS), and equation (A.3) is a simple interest rate rule. Combining (A.1), (A.2), and (A.3) we can form
a system of difference equations that represents the equilibrium conditions of our model, similar to what is
found in Gali (2008): [
Yˆt
pit
]
= AT
[
Et[Yˆt+1]
Et[pit+1]
]
+BT (rˆ
n
t − vt) (A.4)
Where rˆnt ≡ rnt − ρ, and
AT ≡ Ω
[
ρ 1− βφpi
σκ κ+ β(σ + φy)
]
;BT ≡ Ω
[
1
κ
]
; Ω ≡ 1
σ + φy + κφpi
Here we will assume that both φpi and φy are non-negative and the following holds:
κ(φpi − 1) + (1− β)φy > 0 (A.5)
The above condition holds if and only if the solution to (A.4) is locally unique. This result follows the
work of Blanchard and Kahn (1980) and Bullard and Mitra (2002).
Now we assume that the policy shock vt follows an AR(1) process:
vt = ρvvt−1 + vt
We set (ˆr)nt = 0 and guess that the solution to (A.4) takes the form of Yˆt = ψyvvt and pit = ψpivvt, where
ψyv and ψpiv are coefficients we must determine. Using the NKPC from (A.1) and the guessed solutions:
⇒ ψpivvt = βEt[pit+1] + κYˆt
⇒ ψpivvt = βEt[ψpivvt+1] + κψyvvt
⇒ ψpivvt = βEt[ψpiv(ρvvt + vt+1)] + κψyvvt
⇒ ψpivvt = βψpiv(ρvvt) + κψyvvt
⇒ ψpiv = βψpivρv + κψyv
⇒ (1− βρv)ψpiv = κψyv
⇒ ψyv = (1− βρv)
κ
ψpiv (A.6)
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Using the interest rate rule in (A.3) and the DIS from (A.2) it follows:
⇒ Yˆt = Et[Yˆt+1]− 1
σ
(
(ρ+ φpipit + φyYˆt + vt)− Et[pit+1]− rnt
)
We assume no technological shocks, i.e. rnt − ρ = σψnyaEt[∆at+1] = 0
⇒ Yˆt = Et[Yˆt+1]− 1
σ
(
φpipit + φyYˆt + vt − Et[pit+1]
)
We can use the above results to solve for ψpiv by substituting in our guess solution Yˆt = ψyvvt and
pit = ψpivvt
⇒ ψyvvt = Et[ψyvvt+1]− 1
σ
(φpiψpivvt + φyψyvvt + vt − Et[ψpivvt+1])
⇒ ψyvvt = ψyvρvvt − 1
σ
(φpiψpivvt + φyψyvvt + vt − ψpivρvvt])
⇒ ψyvvt = σρv − φy
σ
ψyvvt − φpi − ρv
σ
ψpivvt − 1
σ
vt
⇒ σψyv = (σρv − φy)ψyv − (φpi − ρv)ψpiv − 1
Now we can substitute in our result from (A.6):
⇒ (σ(1− ρv) + φy)
(
1− βρv
κ
)
ψpiv + (φpi − ρv)ψpiv = −1
⇒ (1− βρv)(σ(1− ρv) + φy) + κ(φpi − ρv)
κ
ψpiv = −1
⇒ ψpiv = −κ
(1− βρv)(σ(1− ρv) + φy) + κ(φpi − ρv)
Letting Λv ≡ 1(1−βρv)(σ(1−ρv)+φy)+κ(φpi−ρv) it follows:
ψpiv = −κΛv (A.7)
We can now substitute (A.7) into our solution in (A.6) to get an expression for ψyv solely in terms of
our model’s parameters:
ψyv =
(
(1− βρv)
κ
)
(−κΛv) = −(1− βρv)Λv
Since we have now found values of our coefficients (ψyv and ψpiv) that depend only on the models
parameters, we can plug substitute our solutions for these coefficients back into our guess solutions for (A.4):
Yˆt = ψyvvt = −(1− βρv)Λvvt
pit = ψpivvt = −κΛvvt
It should be noted that as long as (A.5) holds, Λv > 0.
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Appendix B
A Closed Economy Asset Pricing Model
In this Appendix we will derive solutions for various components in the closed economy asset pricing
model we have developed.
ft ≈ αY¯
∞∑
i=1
βjEt[1 + σYˆt + (1− σ)Yˆt+j + 1
2
σ(σ − 1)Yˆt2
− 1
2
σ(1− σ)Yˆ 2t+j + σ(1− σ)YˆtYˆt+j ]
(B.1)
In order to simplify the right hand side of (B.1), we must first simplify six sums:
i)
∞∑
i=1
βjEt[1] =
1
1− β − 1 =
1
1− β −
(
1− β
1− β
)
=
β
1− β (B.2)
ii)
∞∑
i=1
βjEt[σYˆt] = σ
∞∑
i=1
βjEt[−(1− βρv)Λvvt]
⇒
∞∑
i=1
βjEt[σYˆt] = −σ(1− βρv)Λvvt
(
β
1− β
)
(B.3)
iii)
∞∑
i=1
βjEt[(1− σ)Yˆt+j ] = (1− σ)
∞∑
i=1
βjEt[−(1− βρv)Λvvt+j ]
= −(1− σ)(1− βρv)Λv
∞∑
i=1
βjEt[vt+j ]
= −(1− σ)(1− βρv)Λvvt
∞∑
i=1
(βρv)
j
Since vt is AR(1) ⇒ Et[vt+j ] = ρjvvt
⇒
∞∑
i=1
βjEt[(1− σ)Yˆt+j ] = −(1− σ)(1− βρv)Λvvt
(
βρv
1− βρv
)
(B.4)
iv)
∞∑
i=1
βjEt[
1
2
σ(σ − 1)Yˆt2] = 1
2
σ(σ − 1)
∞∑
i=1
βjEt[(1− βρv)2Λ2vv2t ]
⇒
∞∑
i=1
βjEt[
1
2
σ(σ − 1)Yˆt2] = 1
2
σ(σ − 1)(1− βρv)2Λ2vv2t
(
β
1− β
)
(B.5)
v)
∞∑
i=1
βjEt[−1
2
σ(1− σ)Yˆ 2t+j ] = −
1
2
σ(1− σ)(1− βρv)2Λ2v
∞∑
i=1
βjEt[v
2
t+j ]
vt = ρvvt−1 + vt
⇒ vt+j = ρvvt+j−1 + t+j
vt+j = ρv(ρvvt+j−2 + t+j−1) + t+j
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Iterating forward j periods:
vt+j = ρ
j
vvt + ρ
j−1
v t+1 + ρ
j−2
v t+2 + · · ·+ ρj−(j−1)v t+j−1 + t+j
Note that Et[t+it+j ] = 0 ∀ i 6= j this follows because  is assumed to be i.i.d. and Et[vtt+i] =
0 ∀ i > 0 because Et[t+1] = 0 ∀ i > 0. The meaningful result is that all cross products will equal zero
when we take the expectation of (vt+j)
2.
⇒ Et[(vt+j)2] = Et[(ρjvvt)2 + (ρj−1v t+1)2 + (ρj−2v t+2)2 + . . .
· · ·+ (ρvt+j−1)2 + 2t+j ]
⇒ Et[(vt+j)2] = ρ2jv Et[v2t ] + ρ2(j−1)v Et[2t+1] + ρ2(j−2)v Et[2t+2] + . . .
· · ·+ ρ2vEt[2t+j−1] + Et[2t+j ]
Here we can use the fact that Et[v
2
t ] = v
2
t since it is the current shock and can be measured. As well,
we note that Et[
2
t+i] = V art[t+i] = σ
2
 ∀ i > 0 which follows from the fact that Et[t+i] = 0
⇒ Et[(vt+j)2] = ρ2jv v2t + σ2
j∑
i=1
ρ2(j−i)v = ρ
2j
v v
2
t + σ
2

j−1∑
i=0
ρ2iv
We can use the generalized solution:
p∑
n=o
mk =
mo −mp+1
1−m for m 6= 1
⇒
j−1∑
i=0
ρ2iv =
1− ρ2jv
1− ρ2v
⇒ Et[(vt+j)2] = ρ2jv v2t + σ2
(
1− ρ2jv
1− ρ2v
)
⇒
∞∑
i=1
βjEt[v
2
t+j ] =
∞∑
i=1
βjEt[ρ
2j
v v
2
t + σ
2

(
1− ρ2jv
1− ρ2v
)
]
= v2t
∞∑
i=1
(βρ2v)
j + σ2
(
1
1− ρ2v
)( ∞∑
i=1
βj −
∞∑
i=1
(βρ2v)
j
)
= v2t
(
ρ2vβ
1− ρ2vβ
)
+ σ2
(
1
1− ρ2v
)[
β
1− β −
ρ2vβ
1− ρ2vβ
]
= v2t
(
ρ2vβ
1− ρ2vβ
)
+ σ2
(
1
1− ρ2v
)[
β − ρ2vβ2 − ρ2vβ + ρ2vβ2
(1− β)(1− ρ2vβ)
]
= v2t
(
ρ2vβ
1− ρ2vβ
)
+ σ2
(
1
1− ρ2v
)[
β(1− ρ2v)
(1− β)(1− ρ2vβ)
]
⇒
∞∑
i=1
βjEt[v
2
t+j ] = v
2
t
(
ρ2vβ
1− ρ2vβ
)
+ σ2
β
(1− β)(1− ρ2vβ)
⇒
∞∑
i=1
βjEt[−1
2
σ(1− σ)Yˆ 2t+j ]
= −1
2
σ(1− σ)(1− βρv)2Λ2v
[
v2t
(
ρ2vβ
1− ρ2vβ
)
+ σ2
β
(1− β)(1− ρ2vβ)
] (B.6)
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vi)
∞∑
i=1
βjEt[σ(1− σ)YˆtYˆt+j ] = σ(1− σ)
∞∑
i=1
βjEt[(1− βρv)2Λ2vvtvt+j ]
= σ(1− σ)(1− βρv)2Λ2vv2t
∞∑
i=1
(βρv)
j
⇒
∞∑
i=1
βjEt[σ(1− σ)YˆtYˆt+j ] = σ(1− σ)(1− βρv)2Λ2vv2t
(
βρv
1− βρv
)
(B.7)
Note that vt is AR(1) ⇒ Et[vtvt+j ] = vtEt[vt+j ] = v2t ρjv. Now we can return to the second-order
approximation for real firm prices:
ft ≈ αY¯
∞∑
i=1
βjEt[1 + σYˆt + (1− σ)Yˆt+j + 1
2
σ(σ − 1)Yˆt2
− 1
2
σ(1− σ)Yˆ 2t+j + σ(1− σ)YˆtYˆt+j ]
(B.8)
Using our results from (B.2), (B.3), (B.4), (B.5), (B.6), and (B.7):
⇒ ft = αY¯
[ β
1− β − σ(1− βρv)Λvvt
(
β
1− β
)
− (1− σ)(1− βρv)Λvvt
(
βρv
1− βρv
)
+
1
2
σ(σ − 1)(1− βρv)2Λ2vv2t
(
β
1− β
)
− 1
2
σ(1− σ)(1− βρv)2Λ2v
[
v2t
(
ρ2vβ
1− ρ2vβ
)
+ σ2
β
(1− β)(1− ρ2vβ)
]
+ σ(1− σ)(1− βρv)2Λ2vvt
(
βρv
1− βρv
)]
(B.9)
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Appendix C
An Open Economy New Keynesian Output Gap
Here we take an approach similar to Appendix A and extend it for the open economy. Now, there will
be two separate systems: the foreign system and the domestic system. First, we will analyze the foreign
system which will behave exactly like the closed economy in Appendix A because we assume the domestic
system is small relative to the foreign system and thus foreign policy is agnostic to domestic shocks.
pift = βEt[pi
f
t+1] + κYˆ
f
t (C.1)
Yˆ ft = −
1
σ
(ift − Et[pift+1]− rnt ) + Et[Yˆ ft+1] (C.2)
ift = ρ+ φpipi
f
t + φyYˆ
f
t + v
f
t (C.3)
vft = ρvv
f
t−1 + 
vf
t
Aside from the superscripts specifying that the variables we are dealing with are the foreign variables,
we notice that these equations are identical to Appendix A, and thus we will get a nearly identical result by
duplicating the same procedure. Letting Λf ≡ 1(1−βρv)(σ(1−ρv)+φy)+κ(φpi−ρv) it follows:
Yˆ ft = ψ
f
yvv
f
t = −(1− βρv)Λfvft (C.4)
pift = ψpivv
f
t = −κΛfvft (C.5)
Again, the solution is identical aside from the superscripts, and the restrictions are the same as Appendix
A. Λf > 0 as long as the Blanchard-Kahn condition is satisfied. Now we are prepared to analyze the domestic
system.
piht = βEt[pi
h
t+1] + κYˆ
h
t (C.6)
Yˆ ht = −
1
σ
(iht − Et[piht+1]− rnt ) + Et[Yˆ ht+1] (C.7)
iht = ρ+ φ
h
pipi
h
t + φ
h
y Yˆ
h
t + φ
f
pipi
f
t + φ
f
y Yˆ
f
t + v
h
t (C.8)
vht = ρvv
h
t−1 + 
vh
t
The important distinction comes in (C.8) where the domestic policy function now reacts not only to
domestic inflation and the domestic output gap, but also foreign inflation and the foreign output gap. The
domestic policy shock vht is seen directly, and the foreign policy shock v
f
t will be part of the equation through
its effect on foreign output and inflation.
Similar to Appendix A we will proceed by forming a guess solution. The difference now is that we will
partition our guess solution to consider both domestic and foreign policy shocks as follows:
Yˆ ht = ψ
h
yvv
h
t + ψ
f
yvv
f
t (C.9)
piht = ψ
h
pivv
h
t + ψ
f
pivv
f
t (C.10)
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Combining (C.10) with (C.6) and then substituting in (C.9):
=⇒ ψhpivvht + ψfpivvft = βEt[piht+1] + κYˆ ht
=⇒ ψhpivvht + ψfpivvft = βEt[ψhpivvht+1 + ψfpivvft+1] + κ(ψhyvvht + ψfyvvft )
=⇒ ψhpivvht + ψfpivvft = β[ψhpivρvvht + ψfpivρvvft ] + κ(ψhyvvht + ψfyvvft )
=⇒ (1− βρv)[ψhpivvht + ψfpivvft ] = κ(ψhyvvht + ψfyvvft )
=⇒ [ψhpivvht + ψfpivvft ] =
κ
(1− βρv) [ψ
h
yvv
h
t + ψ
f
yvv
f
t ]
Here we suggest the following solution for the pair of coefficients:
ψhyv =
(1− βρv)
κ
ψhpiv (C.11)
ψfyv =
(1− βρv)
κ
ψfpiv (C.12)
Next we will substitute (C.8) into (C.7) and rearrange as follows:
Yˆ ht = Et[Yˆ
h
t+1]−
1
σ
(ρ+ φhpipi
h
t + φ
h
y Yˆ
h
t + φ
f
pipi
f
t + φ
f
y Yˆ
f
t + v
h
t − Et[piht+1]− rnt )
We assume no technological shocks, i.e. rnt − ρ = σψnyaEt[∆at+1] = 0
=⇒ Yˆ ht = Et[Yˆ ht+1]−
1
σ
(φhpipi
h
t + φ
h
y Yˆ
h
t + φ
f
pipi
f
t + φ
f
y Yˆ
f
t + v
h
t − Et[piht+1])
Using (C.9) and (C.10) to substitute for the domestic output gap and inflation, and (C.4) and (C.5) to
substitute for the foreign output gap and inflation:
=⇒ ψhyvvht + ψfyvvft = Et[ψhyvvht+1 + ψfyvvft+1]
− 1
σ
(
φhpi(ψ
h
pivv
h
t + ψ
f
pivv
f
t ) + φ
h
y(ψ
h
yvv
h
t + ψ
f
yvv
f
t )
+ φfpi(−κΛfvft ) + φfy(−(1− βρv)Λfvft )
+ vht − Et[ψhpivvht+1 + ψfpivvft+1]
)
We can collect terms with respect to the domestic policy shock vht and the foreign policy shock v
f
t as
follows:
=⇒ σ(ψhyvvht + ψfyvvft ) = (σρvψhyv − φhpiψhpiv − φhyψhyv − 1 + ρvψhpiv)vht
+ (σρvψ
f
yv − φhpiψfpiv − φhyψfyv + φfpiκΛf + φfy(1− βρv)Λf + ρvψfpiv)vft
First we will focus on the portion of the equation related to the domestic policy shock:
σψhyvv
h
t = (σρvψ
h
yv − φhpiψhpiv − φhyψhyv − 1 + ρvψhpiv)vht
=⇒ σψhyv = (σρv − φhy)ψhyv − (φhpi − ρv)ψhpiv − 1
=⇒ (σ(1− ρv) + φhy)ψhyv + (φhpi − ρv)ψhpiv = −1
=⇒ (σ(1− ρv) + φhy)
(
1− βρv
κ
)
ψhpiv + (φ
h
pi − ρv)ψhpiv = −1
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=⇒ ψhpiv =
−κ
(1− βρv)(σ(1− ρv) + φhy) + κ(φhpi − ρv)
= −κΛh (C.13)
Where Λh = 1
(1−βρv)(σ(1−ρv)+φhy )+κ(φhpi−ρv)
We now proceed to the portion of the equation related to the foreign policy shock:
σψfyvv
f
t = (σρvψ
f
yv − φhpiψfpiv − φhyψfyv + φfpiκΛf + φfy(1− βρv)Λf + ρvψfpiv)vft
=⇒ σψfyv = (σρvψfyv − φhpiψfpiv − φhyψfyv + φfpiκΛf + φfy(1− βρv)Λf + ρvψfpiv)
=⇒ (σ(1− ρv) + φhy)ψfyv + (φhpi − ρv)ψfpiv = φfpiκΛf + φfy(1− βρv)Λf
=⇒ (σ(1− ρv) + φhy)ψfyv + (φhpi − ρv)ψfpiv = Λf (φfpiκ+ φfy(1− βρv))
=⇒ ψfpiv
[
(σ(1− ρv) + φhy)
(
1− βρv
κ
)
+ φhpi − ρv
]
= Λf (φfpiκ+ φ
f
y(1− βρv))
=⇒ ψfpiv =
Λf (φfpiκ+ φ
f
y(1− βρv))κ
(1− βρv)(σ(1− ρv) + φhy) + κ(φhpi − ρv)
=⇒ ψfpiv = ΛhΛf (φfpiκ+ φfy(1− βρv))κ (C.14)
We can now substitute our result from (C.13) into (C.11):
ψhyv =
(1− βρv)
κ
ψhpiv =
(
1− βρv
κ
)
(−κΛh) = −(1− βρv)Λh (C.15)
And similarly we can substitute out result from (C.14) into (C.12):
ψfyv =
(1− βρv)
κ
ψfpiv = (1− βρv)ΛhΛf (φfpiκ+ φfy(1− βρv)) (C.16)
And finally we can use (C.15) and (C.16) to solve our original guess solutions:
Yˆ ht = ψ
h
yvv
h
t + ψ
f
yvv
f
t
Yˆ ht = −(1− βρv)Λhvht + (1− βρv)ΛhΛf (φfpiκ+ φfy(1− βρv))vft (C.17)
piht = ψ
h
pivv
h
t + ψ
f
pivv
f
t
piht = −κΛhvht + ΛhΛf (φfpiκ+ φfy(1− βρv))vft (C.18)
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Appendix D
Open Economy Linearization
Linearizing this function will require evaluating several terms at the steady state. In order to show
calculations in a straightforward manner we will calculate each term individually before combining.(
µ1Y
h
t + µ2Y
f
t
µ1Y ht+j + µ2Y
f
t+j
)σ
Y ht+j = F (Y
h
t , Y
h
t+k, Y
f
t , Y
f
t+j) = F (Y)
F (Y¯ ) =
(
µ1Y¯ + µ2uY¯
µ1Y¯ + µ2uY¯
)σ
Y¯ = Y¯ (D.1)
∂F
∂Y ht
=
σµ1(µ1Y
h
t + µ2Y
f
t )
σ−1
(µ1Y ht+j + µ2Y
f
t+j)
σ
Y ht+j
⇒ (Y ht − Y¯ )
∂F
∂Y ht
∣∣∣
Y ht =Y
h
t+j=Y¯ ,Y
f
t =Y
f
t+j=uY¯
=
σµ1
µ1 + µ2u
(Y ht − Y¯ )
(D.2)
∂F
∂Y ft
=
σµ2(µ1Y
h
t + µ2Y
f
t )
σ−1
(µ1Y ht+j + µ2Y
f
t+j)
σ
Y ht+j
⇒ (Y ft − uY¯ )
∂F
∂Y ft
∣∣∣
Y ht =Y
h
t+j=Y¯ ,Y
f
t =Y
f
t+j=uY¯
=
σµ2
µ1 + µ2u
(Y ft − uY¯ )
(D.3)
∂F
∂Y ht+j
=
(
µ1Y
h
t + µ2Y
f
t
µ1Y ht+j + µ2Y
f
t+j
)σ
+
(µ1Y
h
t + µ2Y
f
t )
σ
(µ1Y ht+j + µ2Y
f
t+j)
σ+1
(−σ)(µ1)Y ht+j
⇒ (Y ht+j − Y¯ )
∂F
∂Y ht+j
∣∣∣
Y ht =Y
h
t+j=Y¯ ,Y
f
t =Y
f
t+j=uY¯
=
(
µ1 + µ2u− σµ1
µ1 + µ2u
)
(Y ht+j − Y¯ )
(D.4)
∂F
∂Y ft+j
= (µ1Y
h
t + µ2Y
f
t )
σ(−σ)(µ2)(µ1Y ht+j + µ2Y ft+j)−σ−1Y ht+j
⇒ (Y ft+j − uY¯ )
∂F
∂Y ft+j
∣∣∣
Y ht =Y
h
t+j=Y¯ ,Y
f
t =Y
f
t+j=uY¯
=
−σµ2
µ1 + µ2u
(Y ft+j − uY¯ )
(D.5)
∂F
∂Y ht ∂Y
h
t
=
σ(σ − 1)µ21(µ1Y ht + µ2Y ft )σ−2
(µ1Y ht+j + µ2Y
f
t+j)
σ
Y ht+j
⇒ 1
2
(Y ht − Y¯ )2
∂F
∂Y ht ∂Y
h
t
∣∣∣
Y ht =Y
h
t+j=Y¯ ,Y
f
t =Y
f
t+j=uY¯
=
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ21
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ht − Y¯ )2
(D.6)
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∂F
∂Y ft ∂Y
f
t
=
σ(σ − 1)µ22(µ1Y ht + µ2Y ft )σ−2
(µ1Y ht+j + µ2Y
f
t+j)
σ
Y ht+j
⇒ 1
2
(Y ft − uY¯ )2
∂F
∂Y ft ∂Y
f
t
∣∣∣
Y ht =Y
h
t+j=Y¯ ,Y
f
t =Y
f
t+j=uY¯
=
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ22
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ft − uY¯ )2
(D.7)
∂F
∂Y ht+j∂Y
h
t+j
= (µ1Y
h
t + µ2Y
f
t )
σ(−σ)(µ1)(µ1Y ht+j + µ2Y ft+j)−σ−1
+ (µ1Y
h
t + µ2Y
f
t )
σ(−σ)(µ1)(µ1Y ht+j + µ2Y ft+j)−σ−1
+
(µ1Y
h
t + µ2Y
f
t )
σ
(µ1Y ht+j + µ2Y
f
t+j)
σ+2
(σ)(σ + 1)(µ1)
2Y ht+j
⇒ 1
2
(Y ht+j − Y¯ )2
∂F
∂Y ft+j∂Y
f
t+j
∣∣∣
Y ht =Y
h
t+j=Y¯ ,Y
f
t =Y
f
t+j=uY¯
=
1
2
(
σµ1(σµ1 − µ1 − 2µ2u)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ht+j − Y¯ )2
(D.8)
∂F
∂Y ft+j∂Y
f
t+j
=
(µ1Y
h
t + µ2Y
f
t )
σ
(µ1Y ht+j + µ2Y
f
t+j)
σ+2
(σ)(σ + 1)(µ2)
2Y ht+j
⇒ 1
2
(Y ft+j − uY¯ )2
∂F
∂Y ft+j∂Y
f
t+j
∣∣∣
Y ht =Y
h
t+j=Y¯ ,Y
f
t =Y
f
t+j=uY¯
=
1
2
(
σ(σ + 1)µ22
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ft+j − uY¯ )2
(D.9)
∂F
∂Y ht ∂Y
f
t
=
σ(σ − 1)µ1µ2(µ1Y ht + µ2Y ft )σ−2
(µ1Y ht+j + µ2Y
f
t+j)
σ
Y ht+j
⇒ 1
2
(Y ht − Y¯ )(Y ft − uY¯ )
∂F
∂Y ht ∂Y
f
t
∣∣∣
Y ht =Y
h
t =Y¯ ,Y
f
t =Y
f
t+j=uY¯
=
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ1µ2
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ht − Y¯ )(Y ft − uY¯ )
(D.10)
∂F
∂Y ht ∂Y
h
t+j
=
σµ1(µ1Y
h
t + µ2Y
f
t )
σ−1
(µ1Y ht+j + µ2Y
f
t+j)
σ
− σ2µ21
(µ1Y
h
t + µ2Y
f
t )
σ−1
(µ1Y ht+j + µ2Y
f
t+j)
σ+1
Y ht+j
⇒ 1
2
(Y ht − Y¯ )(Y ht+j − Y¯ )
∂F
∂Y ht ∂Y
h
t+j
∣∣∣
Y ht =Y
h
t+j=Y¯ ,Y
f
t =Y
f
t+j=uY¯
=
1
2
(
σµ1(µ1 + µ2u− σµ1)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ht − Y¯ )(Y ht+j − Y¯ )
(D.11)
∂F
∂Y ht ∂Y
f
t+j
= −σ2µ1µ2 (µ1Y
h
t + µ2Y
f
t )
σ−1
(µ1Y ht+j + µ2Y
f
t+j)
σ+1
Y ht+j
⇒ 1
2
(Y ht − Y¯ )(Y ft+j − uY¯ )
∂F
∂Y ht ∂Y
f
t+j
∣∣∣
Y ht =Y
h
t+j=Y¯ ,Y
f
t =Y
f
t+j=uY¯
= −1
2
(
σ2µ1µ2
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ht − Y¯ )(Y ft+j − uY¯ )
(D.12)
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∂F
∂Y ft ∂Y
h
t+j
=
σµ2(µ1Y
h
t + µ2Y
f
t )
σ−1
(µ1Y ht+j + µ2Y
f
t+j)
σ
− σµ1µ2(µ1Y
h
t + µ2Y
f
t )
σ−1
µ1Y ht+j + µ2Y
f
t+j)
σ+1
Y ht+j
⇒ 1
2
(Y ft − uY¯ )(Y ht+j − Y¯ )
∂F
∂Y ft ∂Y
h
t+j
∣∣∣
Y ht =Y
h
t+j=Y¯ ,Y
f
t =Y
f
t+j=uY¯
=
1
2
(
σµ2(µ1 + µ2u− σµ1)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ft − uY¯ )(Y ht+j − Y¯ )
(D.13)
∂F
∂Y ft ∂Y
f
t+j
= −σ2µ22
(µ1Y
h
t + µ2Y
f
t )
σ−1
(µ1Y ht+j + µ2Y
f
t+j)
σ+1
Y ht+j
⇒ 1
2
(Y ft − uY¯ )(Y ft+j − uY¯ )
∂F
∂Y ft ∂Y
f
t+j
∣∣∣
Y ht =Y
h
t+j=Y¯ ,Y
f
t =Y
f
t+j=uY¯
= −1
2
(
σ2µ22
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ft − uY¯ )(Y ft+j − uY¯ )
(D.14)
∂F
∂Y ht+j∂Y
f
t+j
= −σµ2 (µ1Y
h
t + µ2Y
f
t )
σ
(µ1Y ht+j + µ2Y
f
t+j)
σ+1
+
σ(σ + 1)µ1µ2(µ1Y
h
t + µ2Y
f
t )
σ
(µ1Y ht+j + µ2Y
f
t+j)
σ+2
Y ht+j
⇒ 1
2
(Y ht+j − Y¯ )(Y ft+j − uY¯ )
∂F
∂Y ht+j∂Y
f
t+j
∣∣∣
Y ht =Y
h
t+j=Y¯ ,Y
f
t =Y
f
t+j=uY¯
=
1
2
(
σµ2(σµ1 − µ2u)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ht+j − Y¯ )(Y ft+j − uY¯ )
(D.15)
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Now we can combine our elements from (D.1) to (D.15) to form:
F (Y) ≈ Y¯ + σµ1
µ1 + µ2u
(Y ht − Y¯ ) +
σµ2
µ1 + µ2u
(Y ft − uY¯ )
+
(
µ1 + µ2u− σµ1
µ1 + µ2u
)
(Y ht+j − Y¯ )−
σµ2
µ1 + µ2u
(Y ft+j − uY¯ )
+
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ21
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ht − Y¯ )2
+
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ22
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ft − uY¯ )2
+
1
2
(
σµ1(σµ1 − µ1 − 2µ2u
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ht+j − Y¯ )2
+
1
2
(
σ(σ + 1)µ22
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ft+j − uY¯ )2
+
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ1µ2
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ht − Y¯ )(Y ft − uY¯ )
+
1
2
(
σµ1(µ1 + µ2u− σµ1)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ht − Y¯ )(Y ht+j − Y¯ )
− 1
2
(
σ2µ1µ2
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ht − Y¯ )(Y ft+j − uY¯ )
+
1
2
(
σµ2(µ1 + µ2u− σµ1)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ft − uY¯ )(Y ht+j − Y¯ )
− 1
2
(
σ2µ22
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ft − uY¯ )(Y ft+j − uY¯ )
+
1
2
(
σµ2(σµ1 − µ2u)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Y¯ −1(Y ht+j − Y¯ )(Y ft+j − uY¯ )
(D.16)
Where Y¯ is the steady state value of domestic output we can express the domestic output gap as
Yˆ ht =
Y ht −Y¯
(Y¯ )
and where uY¯ is the steady state value of foreign output we can express the foreign output gap
as Yˆ ft =
Y ft −uY¯
(uY¯ )
ft ≈ αY¯
∞∑
j=1
βjEt
[
1 +
σµ1
µ1 + µ2u
Yˆ ht +
σµ2u
µ1 + µ2u
Yˆ ft
+
(
µ1 + µ2u− σµ1
µ1 + µ2u
)
Yˆ ht+j −
σµ2u
µ1 + µ2u
Yˆ ft+j +
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ21
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(Yˆ ht )
2
+
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ22u2
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(Yˆ ft )
2 +
1
2
(
σµ1(σµ1 − µ1 − 2µ2u)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(Yˆ ht+j)
2
+
1
2
(
σ(σ + 1)µ22u
2
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(Yˆ ft+j)
2 +
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ1µ2u
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Yˆ ht Yˆ
f
t
+
1
2
(
σµ1(µ1 + µ2u− σµ1)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Yˆ ht Yˆ
h
t+j −
1
2
(
σ2µ1µ2u
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Yˆ ht Yˆ
f
t+j
+
1
2
(
σµ2(µ1 + µ2u− σµ1)u
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Yˆ ft Yˆ
h
t+j −
1
2
(
σ2µ22u
2
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Yˆ ft Yˆ
f
t+j
+
1
2
(
σµ2u(σµ1 − µ2u)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Yˆ ht+j Yˆ
f
t+j
]
(D.17)
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Appendix E
Open Economy Solution (Approximation)
Where Y¯ is the steady state value of domestic output we can express the domestic output gap as
Yˆ ht =
Y ht −Y¯
(Y¯ )
and where uY¯ is the steady state value of foreign output we can express the foreign output gap
as Yˆ ft =
Y ft −uY¯
(uY¯ )
as shown in Appendix D, we will start with the equation derived in (D.17):
ft ≈ αY¯
∞∑
j=1
βjEt
[
1 +
σµ1
µ1 + µ2u
Yˆ ht +
σµ2u
µ1 + µ2u
Yˆ ft
+
(
µ1 + µ2u− σµ1
µ1 + µ2u
)
Yˆ ht+j −
σµ2u
µ1 + µ2u
Yˆ ft+j +
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ21
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(Yˆ ht )
2
+
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ22u2
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(Yˆ ft )
2 +
1
2
(
σµ1(σµ1 − µ1 − 2µ2u)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(Yˆ ht+j)
2
+
1
2
(
σ(σ + 1)µ22u
2
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(Yˆ ft+j)
2 +
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ1µ2u
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Yˆ ht Yˆ
f
t
+
1
2
(
σµ1(µ1 + µ2u− σµ1)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Yˆ ht Yˆ
h
t+j −
1
2
(
σ2µ1µ2u
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Yˆ ht Yˆ
f
t+j
+
1
2
(
σµ2(µ1 + µ2u− σµ1)u
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Yˆ ft Yˆ
h
t+j −
1
2
(
σ2µ22u
2
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Yˆ ft Yˆ
f
t+j
+
1
2
(
σµ2u(σµ1 − µ2u)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
Yˆ ht+j Yˆ
f
t+j
]
(E.1)
Now we make use of our results from Appendix C:
Yˆ ft = ψyvv
f
t = −(1− βρv)Λfvft (C.4)
Yˆ ht = ψ
h
yvv
h
t + ψ
f
yvv
f
t = −(1− βρv)Λhvht + (1− βρv)ΛhΛf (φfpiκ+ φfy(1− βρv))vft (C.17)
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Using the above equations (C.4) and (C.17) for the foreign and domestic output gaps respectively, we
can rewrite (E.1) in terms of the policy shocks:
ft ≈ αY¯
∞∑
j=1
βjEt
[
1 +
σµ1
µ1 + µ2u
(ψhyvv
h
t + ψ
f
yvv
f
t ) +
σµ2u
µ1 + µ2u
ψyvv
f
t
+
(
µ1 + µ2u− σµ1
µ1 + µ2u
)
(ψhyvv
h
t+j + ψ
f
yvv
f
t+j)−
σµ2u
µ1 + µ2u
ψyvv
f
t+j
+
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ21
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψhyvv
h
t + ψ
f
yvv
f
t )
2
+
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ22u2
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψyvv
f
t )
2
+
1
2
(
σµ1(σµ1 − µ1 − 2µ2u)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψhyvv
h
t+j + ψ
f
yvv
f
t+j)
2
+
1
2
(
σ(σ + 1)µ22u
2
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψyvv
f
t+j)
2
+
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ1µ2u
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψyvv
f
t (ψ
h
yvv
h
t + ψ
f
yvv
f
t )
+
1
2
(
σµ1(µ1 + µ2u− σµ1)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψhyvv
h
t + ψ
f
yvv
f
t )(ψ
h
yvv
h
t+j + ψ
f
yvv
f
t+j)
− 1
2
(
σ2µ1µ2u
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψhyvv
h
t + ψ
f
yvv
f
t )ψyvv
f
t+j
+
1
2
(
σµ2(µ1 + µ2u− σµ1)u
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψyvv
f
t (ψ
h
yvv
h
t+j + ψ
f
yvv
f
t+j)
− 1
2
(
σ2µ22u
2
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψyv)
2vft v
f
t+j
+
1
2
(
σµ2u(σµ1 − µ2u)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψhyvv
h
t+j + ψ
f
yvv
f
t+j)ψyvv
f
t+j
]
(E.2)
We can rewrite the above in terms of first-order and second-order terms for each shock, where the zi
below represent coefficients that are a collection of parameters from grouping terms in (E.2):
ft ≈ αY¯
∞∑
j=1
βjEt
[
1 + z1v
h
t + z2v
f
t + z3v
h
t+j + z4v
f
t+j + z5(v
h
t )
2
+ z6(v
f
t )
2 + z7(v
h
t+j)
2 + z8(v
f
t+j)
2 + z9v
h
t v
f
t + z10v
h
t+jv
f
t+j
+ z11v
f
t v
h
t+j + z12v
f
t v
f
t+j + z13v
h
t v
h
t+j + z14v
h
t v
f
t+j
] (E.3)
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Where:
z1 =
(
σµ1
µ1 + µ2u
)
ψhyv
z2 =
(
σµ1
µ1 + µ2u
)
ψfyv +
(
σµ2u
µ1 + µ2u
)
ψyv
z3 =
(
µ1 + µ2u− σµ1
µ1 + µ2u
)
ψhyv
z4 =
(
µ1 + µ2u+ σµ1
µ1 + µ2u
)
ψfyv −
(
σµ2u
µ1 + µ2u
)
ψyv
z5 =
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ21
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψhyv)
2
z6 =
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ21
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψfyv)
2 +
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ22u2
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψyv)
2 +
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ1µ2u
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψyvψ
f
yv
z7 =
1
2
(
σµ1(σµ1 − µ1 − 2µ2u)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψhyv)
2
z8 =
1
2
(
σµ1(σµ1 − µ1 − 2µ2u)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψfyv)
2 +
1
2
(
σ(σ + 1)µ22u
2
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψyv)
2 +
1
2
(
σµ2u(σµ1 − µ2u)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψfyvψyv
z9 =
(
σ(σ − 1)µ21
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψhyvψ
f
yv +
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ1µ2u
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψyvψ
h
yv
z10 =
(
σµ1(σµ1 − µ1 − 2µ2u)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψhyvψ
f
yv +
1
2
(
σµ2u(σµ1 − µ2u)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψyvψ
h
yv
z11 =
1
2
(
σµ1(µ1 + µ2u− σµ1)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψhyvψ
f
yv +
1
2
(
σµ2(µ1 + µ2u− σµ1)u
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψyvψ
h
yv
z12 =
1
2
(
σµ1(µ1 + µ2u− σµ1)− σ2µ22u2
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψfyv)
2 +
1
2
(
σµ2u(µ1 − 2σµ1 + µ2u
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψyvψ
f
yv
z13 =
1
2
(
σµ1(µ1 + µ2u− σµ1)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψhyv)
2
z14 =
1
2
(
σµ1(µ1 + µ2u− σµ1)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψhyvψ
f
yv −
1
2
(
σ2µ1µ2u
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψyvψ
f
yv
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We can simplify (E.3) as illustrated below on a term-by-term basis:
∞∑
j=1
βjEt[1] =
β
1− β (E.4)
∞∑
j=1
βjEt[z1v
h
t ] =
β
1− β z1v
h
t (E.5)
∞∑
j=1
βjEt[z2v
f
t ] =
β
1− β z2v
f
t (E.6)
∞∑
j=1
βjEt[z3v
h
t+j ] =
βρv
1− βρv z3v
h
t (E.7)
∞∑
j=1
βjEt[z4v
f
t+j ] =
βρv
1− βρv z4v
f
t (E.8)
∞∑
j=1
βjEt[z5(v
h
t )
2] =
β
1− β z5(v
h
t )
2 (E.9)
∞∑
j=1
βjEt[z6(v
f
t )
2] =
β
1− β z6(v
f
t )
2 (E.10)
∞∑
j=1
βjEt[z7(v
h
t+j)
2] = z7
[
(vht )
2
(
βρ2v
1− βρ2v
)
+ (σh )
2
(
β
(1− β)(1− ρ2vβ)
)]
(E.11)
∞∑
j=1
βjEt[z8(v
f
t+j)
2] = z8
[
(vft )
2
(
βρ2v
1− βρ2v
)
+ (σf )
2
(
β
(1− β)(1− ρ2vβ)
)]
(E.12)
∞∑
j=1
βjEt[z9v
h
t v
f
t ] =
β
1− β z9v
h
t v
f
t (E.13)
For the following we will make use of the fact Et[vtt+i] = 0 for i > 0 ; Et[
h
t+i
f
t+j ] = 0 ∀ i 6= j ;
and Et[
h
t+i
f
t+i] = cov(
h
t+i, 
f
t+i) = σh,f ∀ i > 0. Additionally, many steps are analogous to the methods
used in Appendix B.
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∞∑
j=1
βjEt[z10v
h
t+jv
f
t+j ] (E.14)
= z10
∞∑
j=1
βjEt
[
(ρjvv
h
t + ρ
j−1
v 
h
t+1 + ...+ ρ
j−(j−1)
v 
h
t+j−1 + 
h
t+j)
(ρjvv
f
t + ρ
j−1
v 
f
t+1 + ...+ ρ
j−(j−1)
v 
f
t+j−1 + 
f
t+j)
]
= z10
∞∑
j=1
βjEt
[
ρ2jv v
h
t v
f
t + ρ
2(j−1)
v 
h
t+1
f
t+1 + ...+ 
h
t+j
f
t+j
]
= z10
∞∑
j=1
βj
[
ρ2jv v
h
t v
f
t + cov(
h
t+i, 
f
t+i)
j−1∑
i=0
ρ2iv
]
= z10
∞∑
j=1
βj
[
ρ2jv v
h
t v
f
t + cov(
h
t+i, 
f
t+i)
(
1− ρ2jv
1− ρ2v
)]
= z10
[(
ρ2vβ
1− ρ2vβ
)
vht v
f
t +
β
(1− β)(1− ρ2vβ)
cov(ht+i, 
f
t+i)
]
= z10
[(
ρ2vβ
1− ρ2vβ
)
vht v
f
t +
β
(1− β)(1− ρ2vβ)
σh,f
]
∞∑
j=1
βjEt[z11v
f
t v
h
t+j ] = z11v
f
t
∞∑
j=1
βjEt[v
h
t+j ] (E.15)
= z11
(
βρv
1− βρv
)
vft v
h
t
∞∑
j=1
βjEt[z12v
f
t v
f
t+j ] = z12v
f
t
∞∑
j=1
βjEt[v
f
t+j ] (E.16)
= z12
(
βρv
1− βρv
)
(vft )
2
∞∑
j=1
βjEt[z13v
h
t v
h
t+j ] = z13v
h
t
∞∑
j=1
βjEt[v
h
t+j ] (E.17)
= z13
(
βρv
1− βρv
)
(vht )
2
∞∑
j=1
βjEt[z14v
h
t v
f
t+j ] = z14v
h
t
∞∑
j=1
βjEt[v
f
t+j ] (E.18)
= z14
(
βρv
1− βρv
)
vft v
h
t
By moving through the sum in (E.3) as depicted in (E.4) to (E.18), we come to:
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⇒ ft ≈ αY¯
[ β
1− β +
β
1− β z1v
h
t +
β
1− β z2v
f
t (E.19)
+
βρv
1− βρv z3v
h
t +
βρv
1− βρv z4v
f
t +
β
1− β z5(v
h
t )
2 +
β
1− β z6(v
f
t )
2
+ z7
[
(vht )
2
(
βρ2v
1− βρ2v
)
+ (σh )
2
(
β
(1− β)(1− ρ2vβ)
)]
+ z8
[
(vft )
2
(
βρ2v
1− βρ2v
)
+ (σf )
2
(
β
(1− β)(1− ρ2vβ)
)]
+
β
1− β z9v
h
t v
f
t
+ z10
[(
βρ2v
1− βρ2v
)
vht v
f
t +
β
(1− β)(1− ρ2vβ)
σh,f
]
+
(
βρv
1− βρv
)
z11v
f
t v
h
t
+
(
βρv
1− βρv
)
z12(v
f
t )
2 +
(
βρv
1− βρv
)
z13(v
h
t )
2 +
(
βρv
1− βρv
)
z14v
f
t v
h
t
]
By grouping terms above with respect to first-order and second-order effects of the various shocks,
including interactions, we can write our open economy result in the same format as the closed economy result,
but with significantly more terms given the influence of foreign monetary policy shocks and corresponding
interactions. As well, most of the bi terms are now much more complex with significantly more parameters
embedded.
⇒ ft ≈ b0 + b1vht + b2(vht )2 + b3(σh )2 + b4vft + b5(vft )2 (E.20)
+ b6(σ
f
 )
2 + b7v
h
t v
f
t + b8σh,f
With the various bi as follows:
b0 = α
(
β
1− β
)
Y¯
b1 = α
(
β
1− β z1 +
βρv
1− βρv z3
)
Y¯ = α
(
β
1− β
(
σµ1
µ1 + µ2u
)
ψhyv +
βρv
1− βρv
(
µ1 + µ2u− σµ1
µ1 + µ2u
)
ψhyv
)
Y¯
b2 = α
(
β
1− β z5 +
βρ2v
1− βρ2v
z7 +
βρv
1− βρv z13
)
Y¯
= α
(
β
2(1− β)
[(
σ(σ − 1)µ21
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψhyv)
2
]
+
βρ2v
2(1− βρ2v)
[(
σµ1(σµ1 − µ1 − 2µ2u)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψhyv)
2
]
+
βρv
2(1− βρv)
[(
σµ1(µ1 + µ2u− σµ1
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψhyv)
2
])
Y¯
b3 = α
[
β
(1− β)(1− ρ2vβ)
z7
]
Y¯ = α
(
β
2(1− β)(1− ρ2vβ)
)[(
σµ1(σµ1 − µ1 − 2µ2u)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψhyv)
2
]
Y¯
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b4 = α
(
β
1− β z2 +
βρv
1− βρv z4
)
Y¯
= α
(
β
1− β
(
σµ1
µ1 + µ2u
)
ψfyv +
βρv
1− βρv
(
µ1 + µ2u+ σµ1
µ1 + µ2u
)
ψfyv
+
(
β
1− β −
βρv
1− βρv
)(
σµ2u
µ1 + µ2u
)
ψyv
)
Y¯
b5 = α
(
β
1− β z6 +
βρ2v
1− βρ2v
z8 +
βρv
1− βρv z12
)
Y¯
= α
(
β
2(1− β)
[(
σ(σ − 1)µ21
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψfyv)
2 +
(
σ(σ − 1)µ22u2
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψyv)
2 +
(
σ(σ − 1)µ1µ2u
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψyvψ
f
yv
]
+
βρ2v
2(1− βρ2v)
[(
σµ1(σµ1 − µ1 − 2µ2u)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψfyv)
2 +
(
σ(σ + 1)µ22u
2
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψyv +
(
σµ2u(σµ1 − µ2u)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψfyvψyv
]
+
βρv
2(1− βρv)
[(
σµ1(µ1 + µ2u− σµ1)− σ2µ22u2
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψfyv)
2 +
(
σµ2u(µ1 − 2σµ1 + µ2u
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψyvψ
f
yv
])
Y¯
b6 = α
(
β
(1− β)(1− ρ2vβ)
z8
)
Y¯
= α
(
β
2(1− β)(1− ρ2vβ)
)[(
σµ1(σµ1 − µ1 − 2µ2u)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
(ψfyv)
2 +
(
σ(σ + 1)µ22u
2
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψyv
+
(
σµ2u(σµ1 − µ2u)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψfyvψyv
]
Y¯
b7 = α
(
β
1− β z9 +
βρ2v
1− βρ2v
z10 +
βρv
1− βρv z11 +
βρv
1− βρv z14
)
Y¯
= α
(
β
1− β
[(
σ(σ − 1)µ21
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψhyvψ
f
yv +
1
2
(
σ(σ − 1)µ1µ2u
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψyvψ
h
yv
]
+
βρ2v
1− βρ2v
[(
σµ1(σµ1 − µ1 − 2µ2u)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψhyvψ
f
yv +
1
2
(
σµ2u(σµ1 − µ2u)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψyvψ
h
yv
]
+
βρv
2(1− βρv)
[(
σµ1(µ1 + µ2u− σµ1)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψhyvψ
f
yv +
(
σµ2(µ1 + µ2u− σµ1)u
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψyvψ
h
yv
]
+
βρv
2(1− βρv)
[(
σµ1(µ1 + µ2u− σµ1)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψhyvψ
f
yv −
(
σ2µ1µ2u
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψyvψ
f
yv
])
Y¯
b8 = α
(
β
(1− β)(1− ρ2vβ)
z10
)
Y¯
= α
(
β
(1− β)(1− ρ2vβ)
)[(
σµ1(σµ1 − µ1 − 2µ2u)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψhyvψ
f
yv +
1
2
(
σµ2u(σµ1 − µ2u)
(µ1 + µ2u)2
)
ψyvψ
h
yv
]
Y¯
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Appendix F
A Special Case Closed Economy Model
In this Appendix we will derive the results for the special case of a closed economy where σ = 1 and
the utility function takes the form of log utility with U(Ct, Nt) = ln(Ct) + ln(Nt) and u
′(Ct) = 1ct . Here we
can begin with our original definition of firm price in (3.1):
ft =
∞∑
j=1
βjEt
[
u′(Ct+j)
u′(Ct)
dt+j
]
(F.1)
u′(Ct) =
1
Ct
⇒ u
′(Ct+j)
u′(Ct)
=
Ct
Ct+j
⇒ ft =
∞∑
j=1
βjEt
[
Ct
Ct+j
dt+j
]
(F.2)
Substituting our definition of dividends into (F.2):
dt+j = Yt+j − Wt+j
Pt+j
Nt+j
⇒ ft =
∞∑
j=1
βjEt
[
Ct
Ct+j
(
Yt+j − Wt+j
Pt+j
Nt+j
)]
(F.3)
Imposing our two market clearing conditions:
i) Goods Market Clearing⇒ Ct = Yt
ii) Labour Market Clearing⇒ Wt+jPt+j =
∂Yt+j
∂Nt+j
= (1− α)At+jN−αt+j
⇒ ft =
∞∑
j=1
βjEt
[
Yt
Yt+j
(
Yt+j − (1− α)At+jN1−αt+j
)]
(F.4)
Here we use our approximation from Gali (2008):
Yt ≈ AtN1−αt
⇒ Yt+j ≈ At+jN1−αt+j
Which yields the following result:
⇒ ft =
∞∑
j=1
βjEt [Yt − (1− α)Yt]
⇒ ft = α
∞∑
j=1
βjEt [Yt] (F.5)
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We can approximate (F.5) around the steady state value of output where Y¯ is the steady state value
of output and the output gap is defined as Yˆt =
Yt−Y¯
(Y¯ )
:
Yt ≈ Y¯ + (Yt − Y¯ )
⇒ Yt ≈ Y¯ (1 + Yˆ ) (F.6)
(F.6) looks much different than our results where σ < 1 due to the fact we’re only dealing with one
linear term Yt. Now substitution (F.6) into (F.5) yields:
ft ≈ α
∞∑
j=1
βjEt
[
Y¯ (1 + Yˆ )
]
(F.7)
ft ≈ αY¯
∞∑
j=1
βjEt
[
1 + Yˆ
]
ft ≈ αY¯
[
β
1− β − (1− βρv)Λvvt
β
1− β
]
ft ≈ αY¯
(
β
1− β
)
[1− (1− βρv)Λvvt] (F.8)
Now (F.8) becomes a special case of (3.7) where b0 = αY¯
(
β
1−β
)
and b1 = αY¯
(
β
1−β
)
(1− βρv)Λv with
b2 = b3 = 0. The constant relative risk aversion associated with this special case of log utility where σ = 1
results in b2 = b3 = 0 which means that variances do not impact firm prices. Rather, our approximation for
firm price collapses to a present value of steady state output plus a present value which depends on vt, the
periodic monetary policy shock in t.
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